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1 
MEMBER STATE LIABILITY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
Daniel J. Meltzer
*
  Despite many complexities concerning proper characterization of the European 
Community (EC) or the European Union (EU),
1 both it and the United States can be called 
“federal” systems in a broad sense of that term.
2  Both are multi-dimensional polities that 
recognize different levels of governance, each with acknowledged power to regulate within a 
sphere of competence.  In both, union law takes priority over Member State law (supremacy),
3 
                                                 
* Story Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to the Law Faculty at the 
European University Institute, who graciously hosted me as a Visiting Fellow in 2004, when 
some of these ideas had their gestation.  For extremely helpful comments, I thank Bill Davey, 
Gráinne de Búrca, Dick Fallon, Daniel Halberstam, Vicki Jackson, Koen Lenaerts, Jim Pfander, 
David Shapiro, Ernie Young, and Bruno de Witte.  Fernanda Nicola was a special help in 
launching me in studying the European Union, and Erik Murray-Knox, Florian Sander, and Won 
Shin provided helpful research assistance. 
 
1This article refers primarily to the EC, as it discusses EU law under the first of the three 
“pillars” established by the Treaty on European Union, but not measures under the second and 
third pillars, where the ECJ’s jurisdiction is restricted.  See generally Gráinne de Búrca, The 
Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional Analysis, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 
55, 66-69 (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999). 
 
2Whether federalism, a label of many meanings, properly characterizes the EU is 
controverted both by politicians, see, e.g, Symposium Transcript, A New Constitution for 
Europe--Major Innovations of the Proposed New European Constitution Treaty, 23 PENN ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2004), and scholars, see, e.g., Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, 
Introduction to THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 1 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).   
But I follow others in using it in the broad sense noted in text, see Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: 
Essential Concepts in Evolution--The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 746, 
746-52 (1998); Howse & Nicolaidis, supra, at 5; J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism Without 
Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra, at 54, while 
sidestepping whether other labels--confederal, supranational, intergovernmental, infranational, 
some combination of the above--might also be appropriate.  
 
3See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: The European Courts of Justice: Beyond ‘Beyond 
Doctrine’ or the Legitimacy Crisis of European Constitutionalism, in THE EUROPEAN COURT 
AND NATIONAL COURTS--DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 365  (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec  
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can be enforced in court against Member States by private parties (direct effect), and thus obliges 
the courts of Member States to treat the law of the union differently from conventional 
international agreements.
4
  Both polities have had to define the appropriate place of Member State liability in a 
system of remedies for violation of the statutory or “constitutional”
5 law of the center.
6  State 
liability may be viewed as an important remedy for individuals whose rights have been infringed, 
an important tool for enforcing the supremacy of federal law, and a politically sensitive sanction 
 
Stone Sweet & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 1998) [hereafter Weiler, Epilogue.] 
 
4See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, Constitutional or International?  The 
Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 
in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS--DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 
3, at 40.  The supremacy of American federal law is no longer at issue.  The ECJ’s elaboration of 
a similarly broad conception of supremacy, see Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585, 
593; Weiler, Europe’s Sonderweg, supra note 3, at 56, was innovative from the perspective of 
international law, in which the principle that national law of a treaty member yields to treaty 
provisions applies to relations among nations on the international plane but not to domestic legal 
disputes in national courts.  See Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the 
Legal Order, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 1, at 177, 182-83 [hereafter de Witte, 
Direct Effect].  Although “monist” nations may choose to give international law primacy and 
direct effect in their national legal orders, the ECJ’s quite different view is that the supremacy 
and direct effect of European law is a matter not of national choice but by EC law.  Id. at 194.  
European Member States have generally accepted supremacy in practice, see KAREN J. ALTER, 
ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW xii, 26-27 (2001), but not entirely in 
principle, instead settling on “a ‘peaceful coexistence’ whose maintenance is in the hands of the 
political and judicial institutions of the Member States.”  Bruno de Witte, Sovereignty and 
European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradition, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL 
COURTS, supra note 3, at 277, 292-93 [hereafter de Witte, Sovereignty]. 
 
5The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has called the European treaties the “constitutional 
charter” of the EC.  Case 294/83, Parti Écologiste Les Verts v. European Parliament, [1986] 
ECR 1339, ¶ 23.  Despite arguments that constitutions are for states and that Europe is a polity 
formed by international agreement, see, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 
1 EUR. L. J. 282 (1995), positing a sharp dichotomy between a “constitutional” and 
“international” legal order may be unilluminating in this context.  See, e.g., Weiler & Haltern, 
supra note 4, at 336-40. 
 
6de Witte, Direct Effect, supra note 4, at 191.  
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that threatens legitimate interests of Member States.     
  The EC has, since 1991, recognized a general doctrine of Member State liability in 
damages for violation of EC law.  American states, by contrast, generally possess sovereign 
immunity from private damage claims for violation of federal law, a doctrine whose expansion in 
recent decades has led to the invalidation of numerous federal statutes seeking to overcome that 
immunity.
7  Thus, here is a striking contrast in U.S. and European approaches that, at first blush, 
seems quite paradoxical.  One might expect the United States--an older, more established, 
uncontroversially federal system, with a strong national government, an explicit principle of the 
supremacy of federal law, and an unquestioned national political community--to have fewer 
concerns about the imposition of state liability than the newer, less powerful, and far more 
fragile European polity.  But the doctrinal pattern is just the opposite. 
  I suggest below that no single factor, but a cluster of differences between the EC and the 
United States, might account for the paradoxical doctrinal pattern.  Those differences include the 
factual circumstances of the respective seminal cases; the historical setting in which they arose; 
the greater hospitability to governmental liability of civil as compared to common law systems; 
the stronger set of alternative mechanisms for enforcement of federal law in the United States; 
the stronger political control over judicial appointments in the United States; and the stronger 
safeguards against unwanted federal intrusions in Europe.  Yet neither polity’s approach was 
historically inevitable; indeed, in the United States, the Supreme Court has been just one vote 
away from changing course.  Nonetheless, the differences noted may help to explain why 
imposition of state liability was deemed to be more important to the center and less threatening 
 
7See p. ???, infra.   
 
4 
to the Member States in the EC than in the United States. 
I.   AN OUTLINE OF EXISTING DOCTRINE
  I begin by outlining the respective liability/immunity doctrines in the EC and the U.S. 
A.  State Liability in Europe
  The EC’s foundational decision in Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy
8 arose from Italy’s 
failure to transpose an EC directive requiring Member States to establish a system to protect 
employees’ wage claims against insolvent employers.
9  Former employees of insolvent Italian 
companies sued the Italian government for failing to discharge Community obligations--a failure 
the ECJ had previously established in an earlier proceeding against Italy by the European 
Commission for not having transposed the directive by the prescribed deadline.
10  Two Italian 
courts found no remedy in Italian law for a violation of European law,
11 but referred to the ECJ, 
under Article 234 (ex Article 177),
12 the question whether a private party harmed by a Member 
State’s failure to implement a directive may sue the state for damages. 
                                                 
 
8Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357. 
 
9In a directive, the EC legislates a framework of objectives and requirements but, rather 
than imposing a uniform scheme, instead require Member States to enact legislation to 
implement (“transpose”) the directive.  For a thoughtful comparison of directives to the 
American constitutional doctrine prohibiting Congress from “commandeering” American states 
to enact implementing legislation or to execute federal measures, see Daniel Halberstam, 
Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 
2, at 213. 
 
10Case 22/87, Commission v. Italy, [1989] ECR 143. 
 
11See Carol Harlow, Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State, 2 EUR. L. J. 
199, 202 (1996). 
 
12The preliminary reference procedure authorizes, and sometimes requires, national 
courts to refer issues of European law for decision by the ECJ.  
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    The ECJ answered that question in the affirmative.  The ECJ first determined that the 
employees could not sue Italy for violating the substance of the directive, as it lacked “direct 
effect.”
13  The problem was not that the right to protection of wages was insufficiently clear,
14 
but rather that the directive did not specify which institution must protect wages:  Italy could 
have created a public or private system, and had it done the latter, the government would not 
have been liable for the wage claims.  But the ECJ proceeded to find that the employees could 
sue Italy for its failure to transpose the directive into a national law creating some system (public 
or private) to provide the required protection.  The Court proceeded to outline (without 
discussion of their provenance) three conditions for the availability of this right to damages for 
the failure to implement a directive: (1) the results prescribed by the directive entail the grant of 
rights to individuals; (2) the content of those rights can be identified; and (3) there is a causal 
link between the state’s breach and the damage suffered by the claimants.
15  The Court added 
that it is for national legal systems to prescribe the procedural rules by which this right to 
reparation may be enforced, so long as those rules are not less favorable than those governing 





13Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy, [1991] E.C.R. I-5357,  
Paragraphs 10-27. 
 
14The primary criterion for whether European legislation has direct effect is whether the 
obligations created are sufficiently precise and unconditional to permit application in national 
courts.  See generally de Witte, Direct Effect, supra note 4. 
 
15Francovich, Paragraph 40. 
 
16Francovich, Paragraphs 42-43.  The stated qualifications were established principles of 
EC remedial law.  See note 129, infra.  
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  The ECJ has since extended the reach of Member State liability.  It embraces not only 
outright failure to implement a directive, as in Francovich, but also the failure properly to 
implement a directive,
17 the enactment of national legislation that violates the EC Treaty,
18 and 
administrative action that violates EC law.
19  State liability exists whether or not the European 
law in question has direct effect; thus, the doctrine does more than fill a possible remedial gap in 
cases (like Francovich) where rightholders could not invoke the direct effect of EC law.
20   
 Since  Francovich, the Court has also reshaped the conditions of liability.  Today, state 
liability will be recognized if (1) the rule of law was intended to confer rights on individuals, (2) 
the breach of community law was “sufficiently serious,” and (3) there is a direct causal link 
between breach of the obligation and damages sustained.
21  With respect to the second criterion, 
cases (like Francovich) involving outright failure to implement a directive ordinarily constitute a 
sufficiently serious breach;
22 in other cases, a finding of a sufficiently serious breach is anything 
 
 
17See Cases C-392/93, R. v. HM Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications PLC, 
[1996] ECR I-1631. 
 
18See, e.g., Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and 
R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029. 
 
19Case 5/94, R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF), ex parte Hedley 
Lomas Ltd., [1996] ECR I-2553. 
 
20See, e.g., Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and 
R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraphs 18-22; P.P. Craig, Once More Unto the Breach: The Community, The State and 
Damages Liability, 113 L. Q. REV. 67, 68 (1997). 
 
21See Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraph 51. 
 




23  As reformulated, the doctrine roughly tracks that governing the liability of the 
Community itself, under Article 288 (ex 215), for harm caused by the improper use of its 
legislative powers--a parallel that the ECJ has explicitly articulated.
24
B. State Sovereign Immunity in the United States
  The American doctrine of state sovereign immunity presents a sharp contrast to EC law.  
American states, absent their consent, ordinarily possess sovereign immunity shielding them 
from damages liability to private individuals for a violation of federal law,
25 no matter how 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Germany, [1996] ERC I-4845, Paragraphs 21-23. 
 
23See P.P. Craig, Francovich, Remedies and the Scope of Damages Liability, 109 L. Q. 
REV. 595, 604-21 (1993).  On the meaning of sufficiently serious breach, see, e.g., Case 392/93 
R. v. H.M. Treasury ex parte British Telecommunications, PLC, [1996] ERC I-1029; Joined 
Cases T-481 & 484/93, Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and others v. 
Commission, [1995] ERC II-2941. 
 
24See, e.g., Joined Cases C-46/93 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. 
v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraphs 28-29, 41-53; Case C-352/98 P, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and 
Goupil v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-5291, Paragraph 41.  The parallel between Member State 
and Community liability is not perfect.  See Rachael Craufurd Smith, Remedies for Breaches of 
EU Law in National Courts: Legal Variation and Selection, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, 
supra note 1, at 287, 305.  Community institutions generally enjoy broader political discretion 
than national governments, and a breach is less likely to be “sufficiently serious” when the law 
affords wide discretion.  See Brasserie du Pêcheur, supra, Paragraphs 46-50, 56.  Moreover, 
because most implementation of EC law occurs at the national level, EC administrative action is 
less likely to give rise to a damages claim.  See Takis Tridimas, Liability for Breach of 
Community Law: Growing Up and Mellowing Down?, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 150, 175 (Duncan Fairgrieve, Mads Andenas & 
John Bell eds., 2002).  Finally, Community liability to individuals under Article 288 (ex 215) is 
constrained by highly restrictive standing rules, see PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU 
LAW: TEXT, CASES & MATERIALS 487-503 (3d. ed. 2003), while EC law obliges national courts 
to provide broad access to private claims that Member States have violated EC law, see 
MICHAEL DOUGAN, NATIONAL REMEDIES BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE 5  (2004); Tridimas, 
supra, at 176. 
 
25See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
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blatant the violation or serious the harm.
26
  But this general principle is subject to a number of qualifications.  First, while Congress 
ordinarily may not overcome state immunity so as to render states liable to private individuals, it 
does have that power when legislating under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enforce constitutional rights that are recognized in Section One of that Amendment
27 (which 
include nearly all constitutional rights that individuals enjoy against the states).  At first blush, 
state immunity from damages for constitutional violations may seem to be merely a default rule 
that Congress may (but in general has not chosen to) change.  But not only does override require 
congressional action, but the scope of congressional power is limited.  The bulk of federal 
legislation regulating the states--for example, fair labor standards law, prohibitions on 
employment discrimination on the basis of age or disability, bans on infringing patents, 
copyrights, or trademarks--cannot be upheld as an exercise of power under Section Five, and 
while such legislation is a valid exercise of other grants of legislative power (most commonly, 
the power to regulate interstate commerce),
28 the federal government lacks power to overcome 
 
 
26Indeed, while American law, like EC law, recognizes a general principle that a state 
court may not discriminate against the enforcement of federal rights (by according them less 
favorable treatment than analogous state law rights), see, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 
(1947), in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999), the Supreme Court effectively permitted 
such discrimination with respect to actions against the state government.  For criticism, see, e.g., 
Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 965-66, 1003-04 
(2000).  
 
27See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004); Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 
28See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. 
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).  
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state sovereign immunity when private parties sue for violations of those statutes.
29
  A second limit of sovereign immunity arises from the oddity that it shields the states 
themselves but not their political subdivisions like cities and counties
30--even though state law 
creates those subdivisions,
31 federal law is indifferent to whether they do so, and the functions 
performed by state agencies in one state may be performed by political subdivisions in another.  
Thus, Congress can make the city of Chicago, but not the State of Illinois, liable in damages for 
copyright infringement or age discrimination.  American local governments generally have 
primary responsibility for such matters as law enforcement, elementary and secondary education, 
and housing and land use policy; collectively, they employ more people and spend nearly as 
much money as do state governments.
32  Thus, their amenability to suit is a significant limitation 
of the general notion of state sovereign immunity. 
  Finally, the Anglo-American doctrine of sovereign immunity has always been 
accompanied by a regime permitting private parties to sue government officials for specific relief 
 
 
29The same is true with respect to violations by states of their obligations under the 
dormant commerce clause (which has been read as a kind of constitutional free trade provision 
that is self-actuating even absent federal legislation).  Thus, the federal government lacks power 
to impose state liability with respect to the federal duties most similar to the core of European 
law. 
 
30See, e.g., Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 
(1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). 
 
31See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG et al., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 138-40 (3d ed. 2001).  
 
32See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2004-05 at 272, tbl 429 (in 2001, 
there was $1.07 trillion in local government spending and $1.19 trillion in state government 
spending), 292 tbl 454 (in 2002, there were 13,277,000 local government employees and 
5,072,000 state government employees).  
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and for damages (to be paid from the personal assets of the officials).
33  These suits are not 
necessarily barred even when, for all practical purposes, they are indistinguishable from actions 
against the state (as is true, for example, of most actions to enjoin state officials from enforcing 
state legislation alleged to violate federal rights).
34  Yet a private plaintiff cannot always 
circumvent state immunity by framing an action as one against officials, and most importantly, 
cannot obtain compensation (or other forms of “retrospective” relief) from the state itself for past 
violations of federal law.
35   
  Some commentators assert that a regime of personal liability of officials is, in practice, 
 
 
33For a classic discussion, see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: 
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).  Those damage actions, while originally 
brought under the tort law of the states, have been understood, at least since Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961), to be a federally-provided statutory remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus 
paralleling the “federal” basis for the Francovich remedy. 
 
34See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 173-74 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  If only 
the party of record could be sanctioned for contempt of an injunctive order, then suits against 
states and against officers would not be equivalent.  But in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-
92 & nn. 17, 19 (1978), while sovereign immunity would have barred an initial award of 
damages from the state treasury for the constitutional violations at issue, the Court upheld an 
award of $20,000 in attorneys fees from the state treasury to compensate for legal expenses 
suffered as the result of the state’s bad faith following the issuance of injunctive orders against 
state officials.  Responding to objections that a retrospective award for bad faith could be made 
only against the personal assets of the officials who had been enjoined, the Court said that to 
award the fees against the officers personally “would be a remarkable way to treat individuals 
who have relied on the Attorney General to represent their interests throughout this litigation.”  
Id. at 692 n. 19.  Notwithstanding various limits to the scope of this holding, see Gordon G. 
Young, Enforcement of Federal Private Rights Against States After Alden v. Maine: The 
Importance of Hutto v. Finney and Compensation Via Civil Contempt Proceedings, 59 MD. L. 
REV. 440, 457-58 (2000), lower courts have issued compensatory contempt orders against the 
states in a broader set of circumstances.  See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: 
The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 n. 17 
(2001). 
 
35See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  
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tantamount to state liability,
36 contending that because state governments broadly indemnify 
officials held liable, an injured plaintiff can (in two steps rather than one) obtain compensation 
ultimately paid by the state treasury.
37  To the extent that this claim (which I believe to be 
considerably overstated
38) is persuasive, it suggests greater similarity between American and 
European systems than first appears. 
  Another parallel resides in the conditions of liability.  European law imposes damages 
liability only for a sufficiently serious breach--a standard that depends on, “inter alia, the 
complexity of the situations to be regulated, difficulties in the application or interpretation of the 
text and, more particularly, the margin of discretion available to the author of the act in 
question.”
39  Whether a violation is “serious” turns in substantial part on whether “settled case-
 
 
36See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 
84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1998).  
 
37A state’s voluntary decision to indemnify state officials does not transform actions 
against officials into actions against the state barred by sovereign immunity.  See RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHLSER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 999-1000 (5TH ED. 2003) [hereafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 
38Some state officials--notably those exercising prosecutorial and judicial functions--
enjoy absolute immunity from damages; with no prospect of official liability, there is no prospect 
of indirect governmental liability via indemnification.  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 
(1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity).  
Moreover, indemnification is a matter of state discretion and in practice is limited in numerous 
respects.  Finally, even where officials are liable and the state indemnifies, complex questions 
arise about the posited equivalence of state liability and official liability plus indemnification.  
Compare Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1360, with Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment 
Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 881 n. 92 (2000). 
 
39See Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraph 43.  See also Case C-352/98 P, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and 
Goupil v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-5291, Paragraph 43 (“the decisive test” of whether a 
breach “is sufficiently serious is whether the Member State . . . manifestly and gravely  
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law” makes the violation clear
40 or whether the error or law was excusable.
41  Similarly, the 
American doctrine of official immunity generally precludes damages liability of officials who 
have not violated “clearly established” federal law.
42  Thus, both polities generally preclude 
damages liability unless a violation of federal law passes a considerable threshold of clarity, and 
both polities have been viewed by some as “creating an illusion of remedy where few remedies 
are in practice found.”
43  (This is not to say the standards are identical, or that Americans, under 
the influence of legal realism, may not be more disposed than Europeans to find law to be 
unsettled.)  A final dimension of similarity of EC and American doctrines governing state 
liability is that both are heavily shaped by the parallel doctrine governing the scope of liability of 
the “federal” government.
44  While in neither polity are federal and state liability doctrines 
 
disregarded the limits on its discretion”).  
 
40DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 244-45. 
 
41See Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik 
Osterreich, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, Paragraph 139. 
 
42See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (setting forth the standard governing the 
qualified immunity of executive officials not exercising prosecutorial functions sued for 
constitutional violations).  The scope of immunity in actions under specific federal statutes (for 
example, the copyright and patent laws) that apply to state as well as private actors is unclear.  
See Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1357-59.  
 
43See Harlow, supra note 11, at 222.  For representative commentary on the American 
side, see, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Alden Trilogy: Praise and Protect, 23 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 
323, 392-404 & sources cited (2000).  On the European side, see Edward Swaine, Subsidiarity 
and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 35 & n. 
164 (2001). 
 
44American decisions on federal and state sovereign immunity routinely borrow from 
each other.  See, e.g., California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1998) (“In 
considering whether [state sovereign immunity] applies . . . , this Court's decisions in cases 
involving the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government in [similar circumstances] provide 
guidance, for this Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity principles  
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identical,
45 as a first approximation Member States in both the EC and the U.S. are liable in 
circumstances in which the federal government would be liable for a similar violation of law. 
  Still, one should not exaggerate these similarities.  EC state liability is far broader, 
applying to all organs of government.
46  Thus, legislatures are liable (whether for failing to act, 
incorrectly transposing directives, or maintaining legislation contrary to European law),
47 even 
though they are the traditional locus of sovereign authority and their actions typically involve the 
greatest measure of political discretion.  And, as I discuss in detail below, Member States are 
also liable for judicial action.
48  By contrast, in the United States, although legislative measures 
can be challenged (not only by defendants asserting their unconstitutionality but also by 
plaintiffs seeking affirmative relief),
49 a state’s failure to legislate is viewed as a constitutionally 
 
applicable to States and the Federal Government.”).  On the similarity in the EC, see, e.g.,Walter 
van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Areas of Tort Law: The EU 
Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 24, at 125, 132-34; Tridimas, supra note 24, at 150, 169-78.  But see id. at 158 (noting the 
absence of borrowing on the question of causation). 
 
45For example, while an American state sometimes can be held liable without its consent 
(when Congress validly abrogates state sovereign immunity), the United States is not subject to 
unconsented liability.  On the European situation, see note 24, supra.  
 
46In this respect, EC doctrine resembles international law doctrine, under which a nation 
ordinarily may not excuse a violation on the basis that it was caused by some constituent part. 
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 27. 
 
47See Joined Cases C-46/93 and 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029.  See 
generally Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of Federal 
Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 772-76 (2004). 
 
48See pp. ???-??, infra. 
 
49State legislatures have sovereign immunity, and individual legislators possess an 
absolute immunity from suit (not merely from damages liability) for “legislative acts”.  Supreme 
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980).  Suits  
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protected aspect of state sovereignty that cannot be made a violation of federal law,
50 and 
damages liability for illegal action of a state court or its officials is virtually unheard of.
51
II.   CONCEPTIONS OF STATE LIABILITY AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
 
  Whatever the extent of practical convergence of American and European doctrines, the  
conceptions in Europe and the United States that underlie state liability/state immunity doctrine 
differ sharply.  As will be noted, in both cases the conception is not strongly rooted in 
constitutional text but rather is drawn out of structural concerns identified by the respective high 
courts. 
A.  Europe
  The ECJ’s state liability doctrine exhibits its use of teleological reasoning
52 and the 
Court’s central role in promoting integration within the European Community.
53  Not only does 
                                                                                                                                                             
complaining that the actual or threatened enforcement of legislative measures violates federal 
law can, however, be brought against state executive officials who implement such measures.  
See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).   
 
50See Halberstam, supra note 9, at 213. 
 
51See pp. ???-??, infra. 
 
52See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Democracy and Judicial Review in the European 
Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 81, 90-91; Thijmen Koopmans, The Theory of Integration 
and the Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 45 (David O’Keeffe & 
Antonio Bavasso eds. 2000). 
 
53See, e.g., CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 87; G. Federico Mancini & David T. 
Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 186 (1994) 
(describing integrationism as a “genetic code transmitted to the Court by the founding fathers”); 
Paul Davies, The European Court of Justice, National Courts, and the Member States, in 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LABOUR LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES 95, 96 (Paul Davies et al. 
eds. 1996) (quoting former ECJ Judge H. Kutscher’s statement that the greatest influence on the 
Court has been "'the principle of the progressive integration of the Member States in order to 
attain the objectives of the Treaty'”).   
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the Francovich decision not follow from the text of the treaty,
54 but two treaty provisions--one 
recognizing the non-contractual liability of Community institutions,
55 the other establishing a 
procedure by which the Commission may obtain limited remedies for Member State violations of 
EC law
56--could be viewed as excluding, by negative implication, state liability in damages to 
private parties.
57  Instead, in Francovich the ECJ rested on basic principles concerning the 
community legal order said to be “inherent in the system of the Treaty”
58: national courts must 
ensure that community rules “take full effect” and “must protect the rights which they confer on 
individuals,”
59 and “[t]he full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the 
protections of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to 
obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a 
 
 
54See Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference in a Plural Community, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
339, 359 (2002).  The Court did refer in passing to the Treaty’s requirement, in Article 10 (ex 
Article 5), that Member States “take all appropriate measures . . . to ensure fulfilment of their 
obligations under Community law,” as offering “a further basis” for the Court’s conclusion, 
Francovich, [1991] ECR I-5357, Paragraph 36, but later acknowledged in Brasserie du Pêcheur 
that the Treaty “contains no provision expressly and specifically governing the consequences of 
breaches of Community law by Member States,” [1996] ERC I-1029, Paragraph 27. 
 
55Article 288 (ex 215). 
 
56Articles 226-28 (ex 169-71). 
 
57See James E. Pfander, Member State Liability and Constitutional Change in the United 
States and Europe, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 256-57 (2003).  But in this respect, the bridge had 
been crossed in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Service, 1963 
E.C.R. 1, where the ECJ rejected the argument that the existence of Articles 226-27 (ex 169-70), 
expressly authorizing an action against a Member State by the Commission or a sister state, 
impliedly excluded recognition of a right of action by private parties. 
 
58Francovich, Paragraph 35. 
 
59Francovich, Paragraph 32.  
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Member State can be held responsible.”
60  Thus, while starting with the international law origins 
of the EC, the ECJ has viewed the treaty partners as having agreed to subject themselves to an 
unusual degree of supranational judicial supervision, by creating a new legal order based on the 
supremacy and direct effect of  European law and state liability for its violation, in order to 
ensure reciprocal respect for the rule of law and to carry out the purposes of the treaty as 
construed by the ECJ.
61
  The Court did not discuss whether the damages remedy it recognized was necessary in 
view of the existence of other legal remedies (whether national or European) for violation of EC 
law.  Remedies for violations of fundamental law can, Richard Fallon and I have argued, be 
viewed as serving two distinct functions--compensation of individuals and ensuring compliance 
by governments.
62  While a compensatory focus surely draws attention to a damages remedy, 
that remedy is only one of many that could be afforded in order to ensure compliance
63--and 
some have viewed Francovich as more concerned with compliance than with compensation.
64  
The ECJ, however, simply assumed that a damages remedy was appropriate. 
 
 
60Francovich, Paragraph 33.  See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 98; 
Halberstam, supra note 47, at 734-36 (Member States have a duty of cooperation to promote the 
success of the polity as a whole). 
 
61See Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585, 593-94; Commission v. Luxembourg 
and Belgium, Joined Cases 90 and 91/63, [1964] E.C.R. 625, 631; Francovich, Paragraph 31. 
 
62See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1777-91 (1991). 
 
63See id. at 1788-90. 
 
64See Harlow, supra note 11, at 205; Roberto Caranta, Judicial Protection Against 
Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 703, 725 (1995); 
Josephine Steiner, From Direct Effects to Francovich: Shifting Means of Enforcement of 
Community Law, 18 EURO. L. REV. 3 (1993).  
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  More broadly, the Francovich opinion displays little uncertainty.  Although it may have 
generated more academic debate than any other decision,
65 it features, like ECJ opinions 
generally, an impersonal voice, reasoning that is syllogistic or at least abbreviated, confidence 
that only one answer is possible, and no dissenting opinions.
66  Thus, counter-arguments (such as 
concerns that Member State liability diverts funds that political leaders might have directed 
elsewhere, or that national courts, on whom responsibility would fall for imposing the European 
damages remedy, might not do so faithfully) get little play.  Relatedly, the ECJ “has not 
genuinely tried to construct its own alternative doctrine of sovereignty,”
67 and hence Francovich 
expressed no concern about whether state liability unduly interfered with Member State 
autonomy. 
B.  The United States
  The U.S. Constitution, like the European Treaties, is generally devoid of remedial 
specification.
68  But the federal government has long enjoyed sovereign immunity, despite the 
                                                 
 
65Opinion of the Advocate General in Case 5/94, R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, 
and Food (MAFF), ex parte Hedley Lomas Ltd., [1996] ECR I-2553, Paragraph 52. 
 
66See generally Mitchel De S.-O L’E Lasser, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 104-12 (2004).  Opinions of Advocate 
Generals, Lasser notes, do acknowledge interpretive choice, express personal views, and rely 
more on purposive hermeneutics.  Id. at 113-41. 
 
67de Witte, Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 287. 
 
68On the U.S. example, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 62, at 1779 & n.244.  On the EC 
see Erin F. Delaney, “Right to an Effective Remedy”: Judicial Protection and European 
Citizenship, The Federal Trust Online Paper 17/04, August 2004,  
http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/uploads/constitution/17_04.pdf, at 3.  
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lack of any textual foundation,
69 and state sovereign immunity draws heavily on the concerns on 
which the federal doctrine rests.  Those concerns include “[t]he affront to the dignity of the 
sovereign, * * * [t]he inability of the courts to enforce a judgment * * *, * * * ‘[t]he `logical and 
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on 
which the right depends,’ * * * [ and t]he avoidance of interference with government 
functions”.
70  (These rationales have been sharply criticized as unconvincing in a nation born in 
rebellion against a monarchy and founded on a written Constitution expressing the sovereignty 
of the people,
71 and as unnecessary to respect legitimate concerns about judicial interference 
with governmental operations that can be accommodated by more limited and nuanced 
doctrines.) 
  Although recognition of sovereign immunity for the United States hardly requires 
recognizing a similar immunity for the states, especially with respect to violations of supreme 
federal law, the Supreme Court has advanced textual, historical, and teleological bases for 
recognizing state sovereign immunity.  The textual basis is the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."  The amendment, adopted in 
 
 
69Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. 
(4 How.) 286 (1846). 
 
70See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 944-45 (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)). 
 
71See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453-66 (1793) (Wilson, J.); see 
also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-09 (1882).  
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1794, overruled the decision the prior year in Chisholm v. Georgia,
72 where the Supreme Court 
had upheld its jurisdiction to entertain a common law action against Georgia by a private 
individual.  Chisholm had raised no issue of federal law; federal jurisdiction rested on “diversity 
of citizenship”, as the plaintiff was a citizen of a state other than Georgia.
73  While the Eleventh 
Amendment clearly overrode the specific result in Chisholm, whether it was meant to establish 
state sovereign immunity has long been debated.
74  And the amendment’s language, even if 
viewed as relating to sovereign immunity, is narrower than current doctrine, which extends 
immunity to suits in state as well as federal courts,
75 to actions in admiralty as well as in law or 
equity,
76 and to actions filed by any plaintiff other than the United States or a sister state.
77  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has at once claimed a textual basis for state sovereign 
 
 
722 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 
73See U.S. CONST., ART. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . 
. between a State and Citizens of another State”). 
 
74For leading articles disputing that the Eleventh Amendment recognizes state sovereign 
immunity, and suggesting that the Amendment merely restricts the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction against states in actions (like Chisholm) not involving federal law, see William A. 
Fletcher, A  Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983). 
 
75Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 
76Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
 
77See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
  20 
                                                
immunity
78 while dismissing “blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment” as 
ignoring the broader presuppositions on which that text is said to rest.
79  
  A pragmatic basis for the prevailing conception, articulated more clearly by 
commentators than by the Court, rests on concerns that federal court judgments against states 
might prove unenforceable.  Chisholm involved a refusal to pay a Revolutionary War debt at a 
time when “many of the States could have been forced into insolvency but for their immunity 
from private suits for money damages"
80 and when the federal government was probably unable 
to command state obedience to a federal court judgment.
81  Similar concerns about enforceability 
were salient in nineteenth century decisions alleging that Southern states, whose post-Civil War 
economies were battered, had violated the federal Constitution’s Contract Clause by failing to 
make good on bond payments.
82  Other pragmatic arguments for state immunity have been 
offered: that damage awards would divert funds from public needs as determined by the states’ 
political branches,
83 and that effective implementation of federal law does not require state 
 
 
78See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13; Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 
261, 267 (1997); Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987).  
 
79See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996). 
 
80Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999); see also Cohens v. Virginia,  19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 406-07 (1821). 
 
81See John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia 
(1793), 73 N. C. L. REV. 255, 267-68 (1994). 
 
82See generally JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987). 
 
83See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999); Ernest A. Young, The 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2004).  
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liability, given the existence of other remedies (including suits by the federal Government, suits 
against state officials, and Supreme Court review of state court decisions against consenting 
states) when state action violates federal law.
84
  In the end, however, American doctrine can also be viewed as teleological,
85 but the telos 
rests on the Court’s originalist understanding of the political structure in 1789; the Constitution, 
though it limited the states’ power in many respects, reserved to the states “a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty”;
86 “[t]he preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord 
States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”
87  Private suits against 
states for violation of federal law would undermine this foundational understanding, by failing to 
respect the states’ sovereign dignity
88 and impairing their capacity to govern themselves by 
political processes rather than judicial decree.  Of course, the Supreme Court could have 
construed the original understanding differently.  Indeed, forceful criticisms of the majority’s 
understanding, associated with a different American telos--one stressing federal supremacy, 
based on popular sovereignty, and the effective enforcement of federal rights--have been offered, 
 
 
84See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n. 14 (1996). 
 
85Accord, Pfander, supra note 57, at 257. 
 
86Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 245 
(James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). 
 
87Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 760 
(2002) (emphasis added); see generally Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five 
Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1038-41 (2000); Judith Resnik & 
Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of 
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).  See also Halberstam, supra note 47, at 795. 
 
88Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).  
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notably in dissenting opinions in recent Supreme Court decisions, nearly all of which have 
featured a 5-4 vote.
89  But dissenting opinions are just that--dissenting. 
III.   RUMINATIONS ABOUT EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS
A.  Paradoxes
  That the EC imposes Member State liability more broadly than does the United States 
seems paradoxical.  For the EU is “far narrower and weaker a federation than any extant national 
federation.”
90 Daniel Elazar remarked that “the American federation has placed even greater 
emphasis on the liberty of individuals than on the liberties [of] its constituent polities,” while 
“[c]onfederations . . . are primarily of polities which place greater emphasis on the liberties of 
the constituent polities.”
91  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has described the relationship of 
American states to the federal government in terms that even the most ardent Europeanist would 
not apply to France or Germany: “All the rights of the states as independent nations were 
surrendered to the United States.  The States are not nations, either as between themselves or 
towards foreign nations.  They are sovereign within their spheres, but their sovereignty stops 
short of nationality.”
92  Nonetheless, the “right” of a Member State to freedom from damages 
liability imposed by the federal government has been surrendered more fully in the EC than in 
the United States. 
                                                 
 
89See, e.g., id. at 760-98 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 
90See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality, 
in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 2, at 161, 163. 
 
91Daniel J. Elazar, The United States and the European Union: Models for Their Epochs, 
in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 2, at 31, 51. 
 
92New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883).  
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  If these broad conceptions seem more consistent with state liability in the United States 
than in Europe, so, too, do key legal doctrines on which such liability would rest.  The EC 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy were considerable innovations, especially viewing the 
EC through the lens of international law.  By contrast, the American Constitution clearly 
prescribes that federal law is supreme and has “direct effect” in the states.
93  Finally, it was 
clearly within the contemplation of the founders that a federal Supreme Court would have the 
power to review the judgments of the courts of the states.  
  An additional paradox emerges from the premise that courts may feel on sounder ground 
in recognizing novel or intrusive remedies when the legislature has taken the first step.
94  In the 
EC, no secondary legislation confers a general right upon private actors to sue Member States for 
violation of European law, nor are there numerous specific statutes purporting to impose state 
liability in particular subject matter areas.
95  State liability is entirely a judicial creation, and the 
 
 
93See U.S. Const., Article VI, cl. 2 (“The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . 
. .").  The Supreme Court has in a limited respect distinguished the obligations imposed by the 
Supremacy Clause on state judges from those imposed on state legislative or executive officials: 
the latter, unlike the former, cannot be “commandeered” by federal legislation to take specified 
action.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  But this restriction on an 
extraordinarily rare congressional technique, see id. at 907-09, 916-18, should not obscure the 
more fundamental point. 
 
94But cf. Smith, supra note 24, at 289 (explaining the absence of EC legislation on 
remedies for violation of EC law as appealing to Member State sensitivities about the autonomy 
of their legal systems).  
 
95Under the governing treaties, of the various functions of the ECJ--to keep EC 
institutions within their bounds, to interpret EC law, and to ensure Member State compliance 
with EC law--“the original European legal system was intentionally weakest precisely in [the last 
of these areas].” SEE ALTER, supra note 4, at 5.  Compare OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920) (“I do not think the United States would come to an  
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ECJ has rejected the view that only legislation could create a right to reparation.
96  (Indeed, in 
the 1970s, a proposal that the Treaty be amended to impose member state liability was offered by 
the ECJ but never adopted; Francovich was the ECJ’s answer.
97)  In the U.S., by contrast, 
numerous enactments authorize private suit to enforce federal rights violated by state official 
action--notably 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  (While section 1983 actions must name state officials rather 
than the states themselves, that interpretation is premised on the existence of state sovereign 
immunity rather than bearing independently on its appropriateness.
98)  Moreover, Congress has 
sought in numerous specific statutes--ranging from the regulation of fair labor standards to the 
protection of patents and copyrights to manifold prohibitions on discrimination in employment 
and elsewhere--to authorize damages liability against the states themselves.
99  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has not merely refused to impose state liability; it has held unconstitutional numerous 
congressional enactments seeking to embrace that principle.    
  The doctrinal disparity appears paradoxical for still another reason.  State liability in the 
 
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void.  I do think the Union would be 
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”).   
 
96Joined Cases C-46/93 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. v. 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraph 27.  See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 272; de Witte, Direct Effect, 
supra note 4, at 191-92. 
 
97See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: TEXT, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 207 (2004). 
 
98See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that neither a 
state nor a state official acting in an official capacity is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 
when sued for retrospective relief); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (holding that § 1983 
did not purport to override state immunity). 
 
99For some of the leading measures, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and 
State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 47-48.  
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United States would have been enforced primarily in federal trial courts with uniform procedures 
and imposed upon states sharing the same legal traditions.  By contrast, the Francovich principle 
has had to be integrated into national legal systems which vary significantly in their lines 
between public and private functions, systems of administrative law, roles assigned to damages 
actions as a means of enforcing the law, and cultural and political understandings.  Fear that state 
liability might impair  the coherence of disparate traditions of Member States should have been 
more salient in the EC.
100
  A final paradox emerges from the kinds of rights characteristically at issue in the two 
polities.  Federal law in the United States protects a broad set of personal, political and civil 
rights--rights of human dignity and fundamental freedom--against infringement by state action.  
These include  a broad set of constitutional rights--to equal protection, due process, freedom of 
speech and religion, fair criminal trials, and fundamental liberties relating intimate relations and 
reproductive freedom--as well as statutory rights to freedom from discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion, gender, nationality, and disability in numerous domains (housing, public 
accommodations, employment, and participation in federally-funded programs).  While 
protection of fundamental rights has become more robust in the EC--both because of secondary 
legislation and because of the adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights
101--nonetheless the 
EC’s core rights are economic ones--freedom of movement of persons, goods, services, and 
 
 
100See Harlow, supra note 11, at 221-22.  For a summary of a range of views counseling 
hesitation on these grounds, see DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 105-10. 
 
101See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 317-96, 842-935.  
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capital--asserted primarily by commercial enterprises.
102  In general, regimes of governmental 
liability give greater protection to guarantees of liberty and physical integrity than to economic 
interests,
103 but here the opposite pattern appears. 
B.  Explanations
  How might one explain the foregoing paradoxes?  I have no single answer but a set of  
explanations along a broad variety of dimensions. 
1.  The Importance of Facts
  American lawyers are trained to believe that legal doctrines respond to the factual 
circumstances,
104 and thus the circumstances underlying the key moments in doctrinal 
developments warrant close inspection.  The foundational moment for the United States was not 
so much the decision in Chisholm, refusing to recognize state immunity, but the political reaction 
against that decision, leading to adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  It may have been easier 
to fuel a broad political reaction against state liability when no state was defying  federal law and 
the Court’s abortive recognition of liability threatened state insolvency and defiance. 
  The foundational decision in the EU, in Francovich, fueled no such political reaction, but 
the facts hardly placed Italy in an attractive light.  The first line of the Advocate General’s 
Opinion reads:  “Rarely has the Court been called upon to decide a case in which the adverse 
                                                 
 
102See Harlow, supra note 11, at 205, 211. 
 
103See ANTHONY W. BRADLEY & JOHN BELL, Governmental Liability: A Preliminary 
Assessment, in GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 3 (JOHN BELL & 
ANTHONY W. BRADLEY eds., 1991). 
 
104For a classic statement, see Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. 
L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1924) (“Facts and facts again are decisive.").  
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consequences for the individuals concerned of failure to implement a directive were as shocking 
as in the case now before us.”
105  Italy’s broader situation was equally unsympathetic: its record 
of transposing directives was particularly poor,
106 and the ECJ had already held that it was in 
violation for failing to transpose the directive in question.
107  Persistent and widespread non-
compliance with the law of the union may stimulate a more potent judicial response to address 
the defiance--a tendency also visible in American law
108-- while providing less fuel for a polity-
wide political reaction, especially when other Member States had better compliance records and 
thus may have seen themselves as benefiting from more robust community-wide enforcement. 
2.  History (Or, If One Wants To Be Fancy, Path-Dependence) 
  The United States was formed nearly 170 years earlier than the EC, and Chisholm and the 
reaction against it predated Francovich by nearly two centuries.  As Professor Goldstein puts it, 
“America of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was simply a more ‘wild and 
wooly’ society, one where--as compared to late twentieth century Euro-America--bureaucracy 
was less routinized and the populace was less respectful of authority in general.”
109  A legal 
culture hospitable to rights and their private enforcement and to state liability is more familiar in 
the 20th than the 18th century.  Thus, American doctrine may have been shaped by conceptions 
                                                 
 
105Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Francovich, Paragraph 1. 
 
106See Harlow, supra note 11, at 207. 
 
107Case 22/87, Commission v. Italy, [1989] ECR 143; see Harlow, supra note 11, at 201-
02. 
 
108See note 34, supra.  
 
109LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE EUROPEAN 
UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 49 (2001).  
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that were outmoded when the EC came into maturity (and that carry less potency in the United 
States today);
110 had the Supreme Court first recognized state liability in 1991 instead of 1793, 
perhaps the decision would have met public acceptance rather than constitutional override. 
 Moreover,  when  Chisholm was decided the American polity had much work to do in 
order to earn the allegiance of the Member States and their adherence to federal authority.
111  
Between 1789 and 1860, there were “intermittent but fierce” episodes of political resistance, 
“almost annually”, “resistance so intense that federal authority in practice sometimes had to give 
way”;
112 even the seemingly clear-cut power of the Supreme Court to review state court 
judgments was challenged by courts in seven states,
113 and the Court was “a weak and 
vulnerable institution, with the reach of its authority in doubt.”
114  By contrast, the thirty-four 
years that passed between the Treaty of Rome and Francovich saw a level of legislative activity 
from Brussels that dwarfed that of the early years of the American republic, including “modern” 
forms of government action that could not be policed simply by defending against official 
intrusion but which called for affirmative remediation to ensure adequate implementation.  None 
 
 
110Sovereign immunity has been attacked as unfair, see, e.g.,; Kenneth Culp Davis, 
Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383 (1969); Lauren K. Robel, Sovereignty and 
Democracy: The States' Obligations to Their Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. L. J. 
543, 547-58 & sources cited (2003), and has eroded as both the federal government, see HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 960-72, and the states, see Robel, supra, have broadly waived 
immunity.  
 
111See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109. 
 
112See id. at 23, 32. 
 
113See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 479. 
 
114RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190 (2004).  
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of this is to say that European integration and EC regulation provoked no resistance or that the 
European polity in 1991 was without its frailties.
115  Still, when the question of state liability was 
joined in Europe, the polity was more securely established than was the United States in 1793-
94. 
  While federal polities that are extraordinarily fragile may hesitate to impose liabilities 
that will prove unenforceable, as a federal system gains acceptance and power, its courts, once 
embarked on a mission that it views as of cardinal importance, may find it necessary to embrace 
forceful procedural and remedial doctrines to ensure success.  American school desegregation 
litigation illustrates that point: the initial caution of “with all deliberate speed”
116 was followed 
in the 1960s, after desegregation gained the support of the federal political branches,
117 by a 
series of bold decisions seeking to advance the mission.
118  In the EC, by the time Francovich 
 
 
115See generally Gráinne de Búrca, The Drafting of a Constitution for the European 
Union: Europe’s Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 555, 
561 (2004); see also Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the ‘Democracy Deficit’: Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 606-10 (2002) (stressing the 
weaknesses of the European Community). 
 
116Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 
117See FALLON,  supra note 114, at 120; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 74-78, 94-96 (1991) (comparing the Court's 
hesitance in the decade after Brown, when it lacked the support of the political branches, to its 
reengagement after 1964, when it enjoyed their support); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial 
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 10, 13-71 (1994) (discussing the 
many factors, including the support of the political branches, that made Brown "judicially 
conceivable"). 
 
118See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 
(1964) (prohibiting a county from closing public schools and from financing schooling at all-
white private schools); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating a 
county’s “freedom of choice” plan that perpetuated segregation); Swann v. Charlotte- 
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was decided, the ECJ’s integrationist impulses had found important reinforcement in the Single 
European Act of 1986 (SEA), which sought by 1992 to complete creation of an internal market 
through an ambitious legislative program made possible by the departure from unanimous voting 
rules.
119  Judicially-led integration was now reinforced after 1986 by legislative initiative,
120 but 
the accelerating pace of legislation generated an “increasingly cavalier attitude of certain states 
to their obligations to implement Community law, the number of formal notices sent out by the 
European Commission to Member States rising from sixty in 1975 to 960 in 1990."
121  Two 
particularly troublesome forms of non-compliance were disregard of ECJ judgments and the 
failure to transpose directives adequately or, in some cases, at all.
122  Both were involved in 
 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming the district court’s busing order to 
promote desegregation).  See also Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 363 
F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966) (upholding a contempt citation against a school board that disbursed 
public funds to private segregated schools, despite the absence of a court order prohibiting that 
action, on the basis that the board’s right to so act was under consideration by the court).   
 
  School desegregation cases did not, however, generate pressure on state sovereign 
immunity doctrine, as most sought only injunctive decrees rather than damages and nearly all of 
those involving elementary and secondary education named local governments, which do share 
the states’ immunity. 
 
119See Article 8a EEC (as in effect 1987, now Art. 14 EC), as modified by Article 13 
Single European Act, June 29, 1987, O.J. (L 169) 7 (1987) (“The Community shall adopt 
measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 
31 December 1992. . . .”)  
 
120See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2456-72 
(1991). 
 
121Smith, supra note 24, at 303. 
 
122See Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques, 56 MOD. L. REV. 19, 23, 40 (1993); Jean Paul Jacqué & Joseph 
H.H. Weiler, On the Road to European Union--A New Judicial Architecture: An Agenda for the 
Intergovernmental Conference, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 185, 191 (1990).  
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Francovich. 
  Thus, after 1986, Member State resistance confronted an ECJ now standing shoulder to 
shoulder with the EC’s political organs.  Francovich was decided just one year before the 
deadline for completing the internal market, and as “it became increasingly clear to political and 
judicial actors alike that reliance on traditional means of enforcement . . . [was] inefficient.”
123  
Having long taken the lead in promoting integration, the ECJ may have been emboldened by the 
flurry of legislative action to help the EC reach the finish line.  In that context, anticipated 
resistance to the imposition of state liability may well have seemed surmountable. 
  The historical comparison of Francovich to Chisholm and its overruling does not fully 
explain why the Supreme Court, two centuries after Chisholm, not only resisted numerous calls 
to limit state sovereign immunity but indeed extended its reach--definitively ruling that Congress 
lacks a general power to override immunity,
124 and that, notwithstanding the Eleventh 
Amendment’s language regulating the scope of federal judicial power, state sovereign immunity 
is a constitutional doctrine which a state may invoke in its own courts to resist enforcement of 
federal rights.
125  Neither proposition was a foregone conclusion, and while precedent supplied a 
major prop in the majority’s reasoning, four dissenting Justices found that and other 
considerations proffered to be unconvincing.  But if the events of 1793-94 hardly precluded a 
future change of direction, they did determine the initial path of development. 
3.  Common Law Versus Civil Law Traditions 
                                                 
 
123Tridimas, supra note 24, at 150. 
 
124See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (5-4). 
 
125See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (5-4).  
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  Another possible explanation for the divergent paths lies in the fact that only two EC 
Member States are, like the United States, common law countries.  The common law tradition 
relies heavily on suits against officials for both specific and damages relief, while recognizing 
the sovereign’s immunity.
126  In civil law systems, a general principle of state liability (either 
civil or administrative) is more prevalent.
127  To be sure, such liability is often limited in a 
variety of respects;
128 indeed, Francovich was dramatic in part because it required Member 
States to recognize state liability in damages even when national law would not have afforded 
that remedy.
129  Nonetheless, the stronger roots of governmental liability in civil law nations 
 
 
126See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 33.  In the UK, the source of this tradition, the 
contemporary rules on public liability are more complex, but the insistence that public authorities 
are not liable merely because of illegal, invalid, or ultra vires action, and that a successful action 
must assert a private rather than public right, preserves an important element of the tradition of 
immunity.  See, e.g., Merris Amos, Eurotorts and Unicorns: Damages for Breach of Community 
Law in the United Kingdom, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 109, 110-11 (Duncan Fairgrieve, Mads Andenas & John Bell eds., 2002). 
 
127See, e.g., DAVID A.O. EDWARD & ROBERT C. LANE, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW:  AN 
INTRODUCTION 59 (2d ed. 1995). 
 
128See Michael Dougan, The Francovich Right to Reparation: Reshaping the Contours of 
Community Remedial Competence, 6 EURO. PUB. L. 103, 105 (2000). 
 
129See, e.g., van Gerven, supra note 44, at 136-37. 
 
 Prior  to  Francovich, the ECJ had stated that an action invoking EC law in a national court 
generally was governed by that court’s jurisdictional, procedural, and remedial rules, so long as 
those rules did not discriminate against the enforcement of EC law or make exercise of EC rights 
virtually impossible in practice.  See Case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et 
Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, [1981] ECR 1805.  But as Advocate General Léger 
observed in Case 5/94, R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF), ex parte 
Hedley Lomas Ltd., [1996] ECR I-2553, ECJ case law, resting on the principle of cooperation in 
Article 10 (ex article 5), developed an increasing extensive minimum standard of protection for 
individuals relying on Community law, requiring that national remedies for breach of EC law be 
effective and that particular remedies not recognized in national law be afforded, see, e.g., Case  
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may have made its acceptance more natural in the EC than in the United States.
130  
  The civil law/common law divide takes on greater significance in light of the point, noted 
above,
131 that Europe, like the United States, has drawn on the doctrines governing the liability 
of federal institutions in shaping the liability of Member States.  Article 288 (ex Article 215) 
provides that the non-contractual liability of Community institutions shall be shaped “in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.”  That 
approach “seems intended to legitimate the development of the principle of state liability, so that 
it is seen to derive from well-established principles of national legal orders rather than from the 
imagination of the ECJ.”
132  In the U.S., state sovereign immunity doctrine draws instead upon 
the law governing liability of the United States--which, absent its consent, remains immune from 
 
C-213/89, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and Others, [1990] 
ECR I-2433 (requiring the United Kingdom to provide interim relief against the Crown in a 
situation in which domestic law did not make that remedy available).  See generally Smith, supra 
note 24. 
 
 Still,  what  made  Francovich particularly dramatic was its requirement that Member 
States recognize state liability even when such liability was incompatible with basic assumptions 
of their legal systems.  See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 257.  For given that the bar on 
discrimination already required Member States to make available, for violations of EC law, any 
remedy available for violations of national law, it was precisely when a Member State’s national 
law did not recognize state liability that Francovich had bite. 
 
130Professor Pfander argues that the differences are not stark, pointing to the prevalence 
of state waiver of sovereign immunity in state court actions asserting violations of state law.  See 
Pfander, supra note 57, at 260.  However, the conception of governmental immunity as a 
constitutional principle, one that a government must waive by act of its own legislature, is a 
distinctive aspect of American law not replicated throughout European legal systems. 
 
131See Section I(A), supra. 
 
132See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 262.  See generally Koen Lenaerts, 
Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 873 (2003) (viewing state liability as a key example of how European decisions draw on legal 
principles of the Member States).  
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suit. 
4.  The Structure of Enforcement 
  The need for a particular legal remedy cannot be determined in isolation from other 
aspects of the legal and political system.  Apart from state liability doctrine, the American 
procedural system for enforcing federal law is substantially more robust than the European 
system.  First, the United States has a system of lower federal courts with jurisdiction to entertain 
private actions seeking to enforce federal law against state officials.  Federal judges, although not 
unconcerned about legitimate state interests, are loyal primarily to the federal government,
133 
and their life tenure and salary protection confers political independence.
134  The federal courts 
have broad remedial authority and they follow federal procedures that are unlikely to interpose 
significant barriers to the vindication of federal rights; indeed, a number of federal statutes 
affirmatively encourage such vindication by authorizing one-way shifting of attorney’s fees in 
actions to enforce federal rights (prevailing plaintiffs obtain attorney’s fees in addition to the 
relief awarded, while defeated plaintiffs are not obliged to pay their opponents’ fees).
135
  Despite broad federal question jurisdiction, in practice federal rights are often litigated in 
                                                 
 
133See Paul J. Mishkin,  The "Federal Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157, 158-59, 175-76, 184-85, 195-96 (1953). 
 
134See U.S. CONST., ART. III, SEC. 1. 
 
135See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).  Cf. Thomas de la Mare, Article 177 in Social and 
Political Context, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 1, at  215, 234 (noting, as one 
factor for the large number of references from Germany to the ECJ, the “high levels of cheap or 
subsidized domestic litigation by private individuals”).  
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American state courts.
136  But then a second element of American robustness becomes pertinent-
-the Supreme Court’s power to review state court judgments.  Disappointed litigants may seek 
Supreme Court review without obtaining state court permission; not only can the Supreme Court, 
if it grants review, express its view of a legal issue, but it can reverse a state court judgment or 
even, in rare cases, order the state court to enter a particular judgment.
137  Thus, state judges 
know that a failure to respect federal law creates at least the possibility of review and reversal. 
  But if the scope of the Supreme Court’s power is clear, so are the limits of its resources.  
In the 2003 Term, of 80 cases decided by full opinion, only 9 originated in the state courts;
138 
since 1970, the Court has not decided by full opinion more than 167 cases a Term; cases 
originating in the state courts have not exceeded 30% of those decisions (and peaked at 44 in 
total).
139
  Still, the American system looks robust compared to that of the EC.  The EC lacks a 
 
 
136State courts ordinarily have original concurrent jurisdiction over claims based on 
federal law and original exclusive jurisdiction over federal issues that arise by way of defense or 
counterclaim to a state law cause of action.  See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
 
137See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 481-83. 
 
138The Supreme Court, 2003 Term--The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 507 tbl. III 
(2004).  Of an additional 46 cases decided by memorandum opinion, 15 originated in the state 
courts.  Id. at 506 tbl. II(E). 
 
139The annual statistical compilations in the Harvard Law Review indicate that since 
1970, the 1981 Term was the peak for total decisions by full opinion, see The Supreme Court, 
1981 Term--The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 309 tbl. III (1982); the 1986 Term was the 
peak for the number of decisions originating in state court (44 of 152), see The Supreme Court, 
1986 Term--The Statistics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 367 tbl. III (1987); and the 1989 Term 
featured the highest percentage (41 of 137, or 30%) of decisions originating in the state courts, 
see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-- The Statistics, 104 HARV. L. REV. 359, 364 tbl. III (1990).  
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system of lower “federal” courts, and an action by a private party seeking to enforce EC law 
against the Member States may not be filed initially before the Court of First Instance
140 but 
instead only in national courts.
141  While EC law requires those courts to provide effective 
remedies, knowledgeable observers have noted that the barriers to effective enforcement of EC 
law can be substantial.
142
  The ECJ’s superintendence of national courts is quite attenuated.  To be sure, under 
Article 234 (ex 177), which permits interlocutory review of a question of European law, the ECJ 
decides far more than 9, or even 44, cases referred from national courts.
143  But this preliminary 
reference procedure supplies the only “federal” enforcement available to private parties.  In part 
for that reason, the ECJ has its own capacity problems, with a backlog of roughly two years.
144 
Moreover, review under Article 234 requires a reference from a national court.  Although EC 
 
 
140A proposal to permit private parties to bring suit against Member States in the ECJ was 
rejected in negotiations leading to the SEA.  Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in 
EUROPOLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE “NEW” EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 126-27 
(Alberta Sbragia ed., 1992). 
 
141See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 86-93.  As amended by the Treaty 
of Nice, Article 225(1) now permits the CFI to issue preliminary rulings in some cases initiated 
in national courts. 
 
142See, e.g., Opinion of AG Jacobs, Case C-263/02, Commission of the European 
Communities v Jégo-Quére & Cie SA, 2003 WL 101341 (2003), Paragraphs 44-47; Smith, supra 
note 24; STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EU LAW 133 (6th ed. 2003); P.J.G. 
KATPEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 557-59 (3d ed. 1998).  
 
143See, e.g., JOHN MCCORMICK, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND POLICIES 114 (2d 
ed., 1999). 
 
144See Peter J. Wattel, Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like 
This, 41 COMMON. MKT. L. REV. 177, 179 (2004).  
  37 
                                                
law obliges national courts of last instance to refer “unless it has been established that the 
question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been 
interpreted by the court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to 
leave no scope for any reasonable doubt,”
145 violations of that obligation are thought to be 
reasonably common
146 and cannot be reviewed, no matter how serious.  Moreover, under Article 
234 the ECJ decides issues of European law rather than rendering judgment (although some 
decisions effectively tell a national court how it must decide).
147  Thus, the EC judicial system is 
triply dependent upon the national courts--first, to provide a hospitable forum for private actions 
premised on violations of EC law; second, to refer issues of European law to the ECJ; and third, 
to carry out the fair implications of ECJ decisions. 
  Both Europe and the United States also authorize public enforcement of federal law 
 
 
145Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, [1982] 
ECR 3415, Paragraph 21. 
 
146For statistics suggesting only about one quarter of cases involving EC law are referred, 
see studies cited by ALTER, supra note 4, at 34.  See also id at 51; id at 61 (discussing reluctance 
of British judges to refer); 129 (discussing paucity of referrals from French Conseil D’Etat).  
 
  The Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, Annex VI,  
indicate that the number of references per Member State varies enormously, and the variance is 
not explained entirely by differences in country size.  Those reports also identify quite a few 
cases in which no request for a preliminary reference was made, although they involved a point 




147See G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 595, 606 (1989); Craig, supra note 20, at 86 (noting that the ECJ has in several cases 
come close to resolving all of the critical issues). 
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against Member States.  Although in the United States it is far less significant than private 
enforcement,
148 public enforcement nonetheless may be more robust in the U.S. than in Europe, 
for at least two reasons.  First, the U.S. federal government dwarfs that of the EU with respect to 
both employees and budget.  The U.S. budget is about 20% of US GDP; the EU’s budget is 
capped at 1.24% of the EU’s GDI, in practice is closer to 1%, and represents only 2.5% of public 
spending in the EU.
149  The EU, lacking an investigative staff, must rely on complaints based on 
information generated elsewhere.
150  Second, the remedies available to public enforcers are more 
limited in the EC than in the U.S.  When Francovich was decided, in actions by the Commission 
against a Member State, the ECJ could issue only a declaration of violation; even today, after 
augmentation of the Court’s authority, coercive remedies may be imposed only after a prior 
declaration of invalidity and according to a process designed to foster negotiated outcomes.
151  
Moreover, the Member States’ direct participation in the legislative process, through their 
representatives in the EC’s most important legislative body, the Council, as well as their 
(admittedly more muted) influence in the Commission, may cause the Commission to hesitate 
 
 
148On the United States, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private 
Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 36 (1975); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural 
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1384, 1404, 1409 (2000); Meltzer, supra note 87, at 1021-22 & n. 50.  
 
149Compare Iain Begg, Funding the European Union, March 2005, published by The 
Federal Trust, http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/FedT_Begg_EUBudget.pdf,  at 5 
(accessed 4/28/05) with 2004 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 378, table B-79 (US federal 
outlays are 20% of GDP).  
 
150CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 398. 
 
151Article 228 (ex 171).  See ALTER, supra note 4, at 8 & n.9.  
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before seeking coercive remedies.
152  
  A final comparison of the enforcement powers of the center derives from the spending 
figures noted above.  The U.S. government, which dispenses large sums to state governments,
153 
can require recipients, as a condition of receiving funds, to comply with federal programmatic 
requirements.  One condition Congress may prescribe is that recipient states waive sovereign 
immunity (although that requirement is not imposed routinely and the congressional power is 
subject to some, if uncertain, limits).
154  Perhaps more important, even if waivers of immunity 
and funds cut-offs are both rare, the spending mechanism induces states to participate in federal-
state programs and to implement federal mandates; if some friction remains, the funding 
nonetheless supplies an important if incomplete lubricant.  
  In the EC, partly due to budgetary limits, the principal form of action is administrative 
 
 
152See P.P. Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of 
EEC Law, 12 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 453, 456 (1992); Deirdre Curtin, Directives: The 
Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of Individual Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 710 
(1990).  To be sure, in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999), the Supreme Court noted that 
federal enforcement requires an “exercise of political responsibility” absent in private actions.  
But Member State influence is likely to be looser over American federal than European officials.  
Officials of EC Member States sit in the Council of Ministers, which shares authority in complex 
ways with the European Commission, the body empowered to initiate “federal” action against a 
non-compliant state.  See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 161-75.  In the United 
States, members of Congress, though elected in the states, are not representatives of the states as 
such, and our conception of separation of powers does not feature institutions, like those of the 
EC, that mix Member State representatives with executive officials. 
 
153See Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2004-05, 314 Table 472 (in 2002, the 
United States made grants of more than $400 billion).   
 
154See generally Meltzer, supra note 34; Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest 
A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” 
Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2001).   
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regulation.
155  And while some EC regulation of the states--for example, Treaty provisions 
relating to freedom of movement--resembles in form American direct regulation of state 
governmental operations, much EC regulation takes the form of directives that require Member 
States to regulate third parties by transposing directives into national law.
156  The EC 
consequently relies heavily on unconditional mandates of state cooperation of a form that, in the 
United States, would be viewed as prohibited “commandeering”.  Unable to offer the carrot of 
“federal” funds, the stick of federal funds cut-offs, or any credible threat to administer federal 
programs without state participation, the EC may have seen state liability as a necessary remedy 
to pressure Member States to carry out their obligations not simply to comply with federal duties 
but affirmatively to implement federal law.  In the United States, by contrast, for constitutional 
as well as historical reasons, violations of the form found in Francovich (state failure to legislate 
consistently with an unconditional federal mandate) are simply not at issue. 
  What is the import of all of these differences?  The U.S., even without imposing state 
liability, affords a significant remedial system based on private suits against state officials, to a 
lesser extent, on federal enforcement, and on conditional spending programs.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has declared that in view of these alternatives, recognition of state sovereign 




155See Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y 139, 144, 150 (1997). 
 
156See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Blueprints for Change: Devolution 
and Subsidiarity in the United States and the European Union, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra 
note 2, at 118. 
 
157See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n. 14 (1996).  
  41 
                                                
One can fairly argue about whether the glass in the United States is half-full or half-empty,
158 but 
no one doubts that the alternative remedies in the United States remain significant.  In the EC, 
recognition of state liability was more necessary to ensure compliance by Member States, as the 
glass of other remedies for violation of European law is far less full than in the United States.
159  
And recognition of state liability may have had the desired effect in the EC, as the rate at which 
directives were transposed by Member States “steadily increased from below 90 percent in 1990 
[the year before the Francovich decision] to a record 95.7 per cent in 1998.”
160
  The EC’s dependence upon national courts may have made recognition of state liability 
not only more necessary but also more palatable.  In the American context, before 1999 it was 
unclear whether states, when sued on federal claims, enjoyed sovereign immunity not only in 
federal court but also in their own courts.  Some suggested that providing state governments with 
immunity in federal courts but not in their own courts could be viewed as striking a desirable 
balance: the state courts would have factfinding responsibilities, could assign appropriate weight 
to state and local interests, and could participate in developing federal law.
161  In the end, the 
Supreme Court extended immunity to suit in state court as well.
162  But in the EC, concern that 
state liability would get out of hand may have been limited because that liability would be 
 
 
158See Meltzer, supra note 34; Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 154. 
 
159See generally Bell & Bradley, supra note 103, at 10-11. 
 
160See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 156, at 140. 
 
161See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1, 99-101 (1988). 
 
162Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  
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enforced exclusively in national courts.  (That in Europe, damage awards tend to be lower than in 
the U.S., in part because of the absence of lay juries, and court costs often are higher, would also 
make state liability seem less threatening.) 
  I suggested earlier that a fragile polity--the United States of the 1790s--may hesitate to 
impose dramatic judicial remedies upon Member States.  Here, however, I am suggesting that the 
strength of a polity--as measured by the availability of remedies other than state liability, for the 
enforcement of federal law--may also lead to hesitation.  The EC of 1991 may have fallen 
between these poles--powerful enough successfully to impose state liability, weak enough (in its 
other mechanisms for the enforcement of federal law) that such liability was deemed necessary.  
5.  Judicial Politics 
  While federal systems tend to consolidate power in the center,
163 short-term movements 
in the opposite direction may punctuate that trend, and “the rhythms of federalism will be most 
pronounced where democratic influence is stronger.”
164  In the U.S., strong democratic influence 
over American judicial appointments may generate strong judicial rhythms, as ideologically 
driven appointments are accepted in practice and often in principle.  Republican Presidents have 
filled 10 of the 12 Supreme Court vacancies since 1969, and while the nominees’ expected views 
on issues of federalism may not have figured importantly in judicial selections,
165 Justices 
                                                 
 
163See Weiler, Europe’s Sonderweg, supra note 3, at 55.  
 
164John D. Donahue & Mark A. Pollack, Centralization and Its Discontents: The Rhythms 
of Federalism in the United States and the European Union, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 
2, at 73, 117. 
 
165See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 292-339 (2d. ed. 1985) (discussing President Nixon’s  
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chosen for their “conservative” views on one set of issues (criminal procedure, or abortion 
rights) tend to share concerns about expanding national authority and state perceptions of 
diminishing autonomy.
166  Thus, the Supreme Court in the past decade has invalidated two 
federal statutes (one pointless,
167 the other of greater significance
168) as beyond national 
legislative authority, and two others on the distinct ground that they unconstitutionally 
“commandeer” state legislatures to enact legislation
169 or state executive officials to administer 
federal law.
170  But few expect the Court seriously to restrict federal legislative competence, and 




appointment of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist). 
 
166See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 451 (2002).  The correlation is hardly perfect, and 
statutory preemption cases are an important counterexample.  See Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369-70 (noting that the Justices 
most (least) protective of state autonomy in constitutional federalism cases are those most (least) 
inclined to vote for statutory preemption of state authority). 
 
167See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the federal Gun Free 
School Zones Act as outside the federal power to regulate interstate commerce).  Commentators 
of quite different general perspectives agreed that Lopez was of limited significance. See, e.g., 
Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term--Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 
34-45 (1995); Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 552 (1995).   
 
168See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act permitting victims of gender-based violence to bring a civil 
damages action). 
 
169New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 
170Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 
171Thus, in Printz, the majority spoke of “almost two centuries of apparent congressional 
avoidance of the practice.”  521 U.S. at 918.  
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  Insofar as the Court sought a more general limit on federal power, sovereign immunity 
had appealing features: an historical pedigree and a doctrine that, while full of oddities, has a 
lawlike quality that judges may feel comfortable enforcing against legislatures.
172 By contrast, 
many other suggested limits on national legislative power--e.g., a demonstrated need for action at 
the federal level, similar to the European notion of subsidiarity
173--involve open-ended legal 
standards that confer enormous judicial discretion in application; Justice Scalia is a prominent 
and extreme critic of such standards,
174 but his position finds roots in more broadly shared 
understandings.
175  To be sure, many commentators sympathetic to limiting national power 
regard state sovereign immunity as a peculiar means to that end.
176  But perhaps a Supreme 




172See Meltzer, supra note 99, at 65. 
 
173See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995). 
 
174Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 
175See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1026 (2003); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 
943 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term--Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
 
  By contrast, the ECJ, like many European courts, is comfortable enforcing principles (for 
example, the principle of proportionality), see, e.g., NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 198-210 (2003), that would strike many American 
lawyers are remarkably open-ended.  See Shapiro, supra note 140, at 130-31. 
 
176See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 35-39, 48 (2004); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of 
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 
177See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 99, at 61-65.  
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  In the EC, by contrast, the ECJ was committed to European political integration,
178 in 
which it had taken the lead during a period of institutional malaise and inaction by other EC 
organs.
179  ECJ judges, because of “the fragility of the democratic structure” of the EC, at least 
early on, “became accustomed to operating in a political vacuum, secure from institutional 
competition and largely insulated from political opinion” and within “[a] tight epistemic 
community of court, legal services and commentators.”
180  Democratic influence over judicial 
appointments is limited and the consensus-based conventions for judicial appointments lead to a 
centrism in ideology.
181  As Karen Alter has noted, while the ECJ, like all courts, must operate 
within the bounds of acceptable latitude, “political threats against the ECJ simply ring hollow.”  
The Council’s power to appoint, and reappoint, judges “is an especially weak tool in the EU.  
While the Council formally chooses judges, there is an understanding that each country will 
select its own judge.”  Alter notes that in EU judicial politics, as in EU parliamentary elections, a 
broad range of national issues “tend to take precedence over a judge’s interpretive position on 
European matters.”  And “[o]nce appointed, the threat that the judge will not be reappointed is 
unlikely to influence judicial positions.  ECJ decisions are issued unanimously, so it is hard to 
pin activism on any particular national appointee.”
182  Finally, the legitimacy of adjudication is 
 
 
178See Mancini & Keeling, supra note 53, at 186. 
 
179CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 97. 
 
180Carol Harlow, Voices of Difference, supra note 54, at 354. 
 
181See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from 
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671 (2004). 
 
182ALTER, supra note 4, at 199-200 (citations omitted).  
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based more on the written law than upon a visible process by which politically accountable 
bodies select judges.
183
  Not only is there less political control over judicial appointments in the EC, but there is 
also less power to overturn (or threaten to counteract) judicial decisions than in the United States.  
Although the power of the American Congress’ to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction is of 
uncertain validity, threats occasionally materialize;
184 in Europe, jurisdiction-stripping would 
require a Treaty Amendment.
185  Nor can the EC legislative process react quickly and easily to 
unpopular judicial decisions.
186  While decisions concerning secondary legislation (rather than 
the Treaty itself) can be overridden by further legislation without requiring a Treaty Amendment, 
one must recall that a qualified majority (at least) was needed to adopt the measure initially and 
would also be needed for any amendment.
187  Member State concerns must be mediated through 
the Council, and as the ECJ rarely curtails EU authority, the Commission, which has the power 
 
 
183See Rolf Stürner, Suing the Sovereign in Europe and Germany, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 663, 679 (2003). 
 
184See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 321-22, 326-57. 
 
185See Paul R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of Federal Courts: The European Union 
and the United States Compared, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 310 (1994).  One could view the 
Maastricht Treaty as akin to “jurisdiction stripping”, as its addition of areas of cooperation in 
justice and home affairs, and common foreign and security policy in a separate EU Treaty, rather 
than as amendments to the EC Treaty, was precisely for the purpose of excluding the ECJ from 
those politically sensitive new areas.  I am indebted to Bruno de Witte for this point. 
 
186See id. at 344. 
 
187An unusual example of a Treaty provision that partially overrides an ECJ judgment 
involves the so-called Barber Protocal to the Maastricht Treaty, which limited the retroactive 
effect of a decision that had extended the ban on sex discrimination to employer pension plans.  
See, e.g., Volker Roben, Constitutionalism of the European Union after the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty: How Much Hierarchy?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 363 & n. 104 (2004).  
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to initiate legislation, is unlikely to lead the charge.  More broadly, the status quo has a strong 
inertial force in the EC political process, in part because of a fear of opening up complex 
accommodations that could lead to unexpected forms of political unraveling.
188  For all of these 
reasons, legislation overturning an ECJ ruling is rare,
189 and a Court committed to European 
integration is relatively free from countervailing political pressures. 
6.  The Reach of Central Authority 
  A final set of differences between the United States and the EC directly implicates 
features of the initial paradoxes noted above.  Despite rhetorical opposition to creeping 
centralization in Brussels and fears of the emergence of a European “superstate,”
190 in important 
respects--one can crudely label them “substantive” and “procedural”--the threat of centralization 
is far less potent in the EU than in other “federal” systems. 
  Substantively, Andrew Moravcsik has argued that “[c]ompared with existing domestic 
federations, the EU is . . . narrow.”
191  He contends that with a few minor qualifications, the EU 
leaves to the Member States primary responsibility for (1) the provision of social welfare in all of 
its diverse aspects; (2) significant defense, military, and police policies; (3) significant education 
policy; (4) civilian infrastructure (e.g., transport, energy, and other public works); (5) cultural 
policy; (6) important aspects of national legal systems (much civil rights law, policy toward 
                                                 
 
188ALTER, supra note 4, at 198. 
 
189See George Tridimas & Takis Tridimas, National Courts and the European Court of 
Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 24 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 125, 138 (2004). 
 
190On these fears, see Moravcsik, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 90, at 162-63. 
 
191Id. at 165.  
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religion and the family, regulation of political parties and electoral systems); (7) important 
aspects of environmental, land management, and natural resources policy; and (8) direct support 
for business.
192  Of course, as a matter of legal doctrine governing “competence”, Moravcsik’s 
description may be questioned; Professor Lenaerts suggested some years ago that there “simply 
is no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the 
Community,”
193 and the lone decision (some years later) invalidating an EC measure as beyond 
Brussels’ power, the Tobacco Advertising Case,
194 may be the exception that proves the rule.  
Without question, EC regulation creeps into the categories Moravcsik lists, whether as the result 
of Treaty obligations of non-discrimination
195 or of legislative measures. 
  But if the incursions from the center are mounting and may not be subject to effective 
judicial limitation, there remains something to the basic pattern that Moravcsik describes.  The 
EU lacks plenary authority to legislate, administer, tax, adjudicate, and importantly, to govern 
domestic and international security.  And while its expenditures may be significant in some 
sectors (e.g., agriculture) and especially for some Member States (e.g., Greece, where receipts 
 
 
192Id. at 166-68. 
 
193Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 205, 220 (1990). 
 
194Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
2000 E.C.R. I-8419. 
 
195See, e.g., Case C-209/03, Queen (on the application of Bidar) v. London Borough of 
Ealing, [2005] ECR ??? (Treaty prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality requires 
Member State to provide subsidized loans to a foreign student lawfully resident to cover 
maintenance costs).  
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from the EU equal 10% of national government spending),
196 overall the EU’s budget, as 
noted,
197 is minuscule compared to that of the United States.  To be sure, debates over the 
present or future extent of European centralization can have a glass half-full/glass half-empty 
quality; no doubt some regulations and decisions have a considerable impact on Member 
States.
198  Nonetheless, in numerous respects the scope of “federal” government in the EU falls 
short of that in the United States, and thus poses less of a threat to Member State autonomy.  
  Procedurally, several features of the EC political system serve to protect state autonomy.  
As already noted, because the EC’s budget and bureaucracy are limited, “federal” action tends to 
be administrative regulation.  While EC regulation is far too voluminous to be viewed as 
anything other than highly consequential, it often takes the form (as in Francovich) of directives 
that require transposition into laws by the Member States.
199  While directives vary considerably 
in the scope of discretion they leave to Member States, there is a “widespread preference for 
minimum harmonization” which permits regulatory differentiation that enhances the autonomy 
of Member States,
200 and since the early 1980s, EC law “in more sensitive areas has often been 
passed in the form of so-called ‘framework directives’ that in effect provide national law-makers 
 
 
196See Halberstam, The Bride of Messina (forthcoming), MS at 23-24. 
 
197See pp. ???, supra.  
 
198See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 196, MS at 21-30. 
 
199See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 156, at 138-39. 
 
200DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 178.  
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even more freedom in implementation.”
201  Elements like these, permitting Member States to 
avoid uniform central impositions, have been labeled a form of “procedural subsidiarity.”
202
  A different type of procedural subsidiarity is the European version of the “political 
safeguards of federalism”
203 in the legislative process.  Each Member State has its representative 
in the (various formations of the) Council of Ministers.  Those representatives, rather than being 
popularly elected in a campaign organized around political parties that transcend the Member 
State (as is true of United States Senators), are subject to national control as government 
members.
204  This structural feature is a powerful protection of state autonomy.  Daniel 
Halberstam has emphasized it in explaining why “commandeering” is viewed as a preferable 
 
 
201See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 156, at 138-39; DOUGAN, supra note 24, 
at 201. 
 
202See Gráinne de Búrca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam,  
available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.html (1999 Jean Monnet 
Working Paper Series), pp. 29-40. 
 
203See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
 
204See Halberstam, supra note 9, at 235, 237.  (Noting that this is a stronger state voice 
than existed in the United States even prior to adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, for 
Senators appointed by state legislatures were not subject to recall, were not members of the state 
government, and were not required to join their fellow Senator in developing a shared state 
position.)  
 
   Larry Kramer has argued that in the United States, the constitutionally-based political 
safeguards of federalism, themselves never robust, have eroded (notably by enactment of the 
Seventeenth Amendment), but have been replaced by safeguards located, inter alia, in the 
decentralized and non-programmatic structure of political parties, in interest groups, and in the 
career paths of governmental officials.  See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. 
L. REV. 1485 (1994).  On this view, the political safeguards of the constitutional structure of 
Europe can be seen as reinforced by the fact that European political parties and interest groups 
are even more strongly rooted in Member States than is true in the United States.  
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means of lawmaking in the EU and as constitutionally anathema in the United States.
205  One 
might similarly suggest that the state liability for violations of EC law--especially for violation of 
secondary legislation rather than Treaty provisions--may seem less frightening given the role of 
Member States in shaping legislation.  
  A final phenomenon that could be viewed as an extreme form of “procedural 
subsidiarity”-- but perhaps is better viewed as substantive policy differentiation--is the practice 
of permitting states, in one respect or another, to opt out of regimes of community regulation.
206  
Michael Dougan points to “the widespread occurrence of derogations from the substantive 
obligations enacted by Community regulations and directives.”
207  The Maastricht Treaty 
included several provisions permitting individual countries to escape EU law: the UK opted out 
of the Social Policy protocol, Denmark was permitted to maintain legislation on second homes, 
Ireland was guaranteed that its constitutional provision protecting the rights of the unborn will 
not be invalidated,
208 and, most importantly, Denmark and the UK exercised their right not to 
join the monetary union.  More recently, the Treaties of Nice and Amsterdam have 
institutionalized the notion of “enhanced cooperation” by a subset of Member states.
209  But even 
before Maastricht (and thus at the time of Francovich), the more limited form of regulatory 
 
 
205See Halberstam, supra note 9, at 235-38. 
 
206Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the ‘Democracy Deficit’, supra note 115, at 610.  
See generally Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and 
Pieces, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17  (1993).  
 
207DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 178. 
 
208See generally Curtin, supra note 206, at 44-61. 
 
209See CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 24, at 29-48.  
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differentiation noted above was in evidence.
210
   The operation of these substantive and procedural safeguards in Europe depends, of 
course, on underlying cultural or ideological impulses that guide political behavior.  The lack of 
a strong European collective identity,
211 the persistence of strong cultural, linguistic and 
affective ties to diverse Member States, and the absence of strong transnational political parties 
reinforce those political safeguards and militate against the surrender of important national 
powers to Brussels by representatives of Member States in the Council.
212
  One must not overstate the force of these safeguards.  Allegiances to particular 
substantive policies can overcome allegiances to Member State autonomy; representatives of 
Member States may seek action in Brussels to avoid present or future parliamentary opposition at 
home;
213 the Commission and European Parliament are not subject to the same safeguards as is 
the Council;
214 and the Council has not necessarily acquiesced in ECJ interpretations of Treaty 
 
 
210DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 229.  
 
211See Grimm, supra note 5. 
 
212See Vivien Schmidt, Federalism and State Governance in the European Union and the 
United States: An Institutional Perspective, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 2, at 336-37 
(noting that the EU is closer to a federal than a unitary system and like most federal systems, has 
a vertical division of powers between central and component units, but that the Member States of 
the EU have greater independent powers and greater control over the central government than is 
true in many federal systems); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the 
European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 
1689-90 (2002). 
 
213Young, supra note 212, at 1690-93. 
 
214Id. at 1694-1705.  
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provisions that bind Member States.
215  Nor do I mean to suggest that the limits of central 
authority, and these political safeguards, necessarily answer concerns about the democracy 
deficit.  Rather, the point is simply that when all is said and done, a broad set of limitations on 
the exercise of “federal” legislative power in the EC have no clear analogue in the American 
setting.  Thus, in the EC, the threat that the member states will be swallowed up by the center 
may seem weaker than in the US.  As a result, the imposition of state liability for violation of 
federal law may seem correspondingly less threatening in the EC than it has seemed to the 
majority of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, and, by the same token, the protection of state 
“dignity” may seem of less importance in the EC than in the United States.
216
* * *  
  In comparing European and American approaches to state liability, one must remember 
that it was hardly a foregone conclusion that the doctrines associated with either polity would be 
as they are.  Notably, in the United States, the Supreme Court has been within one vote of 
embracing state liability.  Nonetheless, I have tried to suggest some possible explanations for the 




215See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
LAW, supra note 1, at 332. 
 
216I am grateful to Gráinne de Búrca for the latter point. 
 
217Professor Pfander finds fewer points of institutional difference between the United 
States and the EC than I do.  See also Halberstam, supra note 47, at 801 (echoing Pfander).  
Instead, he emphasizes the role in Europe of the acquis communautaire--“the member state’s 
acceptance of the Community as a political institution, together with all of its treaties, 
regulations, directives, and decisions”--as providing “a relatively firm foundation for 
evolutionary constitutionalism.”  Pfander, supra note 57, at 262. Pfander contrasts the acquis 
with the equal footing doctrine, which governs admission of new states to the United States, as  
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IV.   The Köbler Decision and the Mechanisms of Federal Judicial Supervision 
  The relationship of federal judicial structure to state liability doctrine is thrown into sharp 
relief by the ECJ’s 2003 decision in Köbler v. Republic of Austria,
218 ruling that a Member State 
may be liable in damages for a national court’s serious misapplication of EC law.  To an 
American, such a result seems remarkable, as American law would interpose insuperable barriers 
to such liability.  The contrasting approaches may be explicable when the issue is examined from 
the perspective of broader differences in the judicial structure of the two polities. 
  Professor Köbler, who had 15 years’ service in EC universities but less than 15 years in 
Austria itself, brought suit in an Austrian administrative court, contending that the denial of a 
pay increase available to those with 15 years’ service in Austrian universities violated his 
freedom of movement.  The Supreme Austrian Administrative Court, the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof, referred to the ECJ the question of the lawfulness of the denial; its order 
                                                                                                                                                             
backward looking, protecting states against encroachments.  Id. at 264. 
 
  However, in both the EU and the US, new states accept both the state of the law upon 
entry and the prospect that federal law may change--by constitutional (or Treaty) amendment, 
legislation, or judicial decision--in an unwelcome fashion.  Moreover, the concept of the acquis 
has limited explanatory power with regard to the imposition of unexpected federal obligations 
upon the six signatories of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.  Even if one could argue that those 
nations, when they signed the SEA in 1986, might no longer have viewed state liability as 
unexpected, surely the direct effect and supremacy doctrines, on which Francovich rests, were 
themselves considerable innovations, hardly anticipated by the Treaty of Rome.  See  
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 18 (“the first six EC states signed up for a much weaker union 
than the ECJ later imposed on them”). 
 
  Pfander may well be correct that the acquis “represents . . . a fluid commitment to the 
continuing evolution of European law.”  Pfander, supra, at 264.  But since both the acquis and 
the equal footing doctrine require states, old and new, to adhere to federal law as it stands at any 
given time, insofar as EC law has a greater evolutionary quality than U.S. law, the explanation, I 
believe, must lie elsewhere. 
 
218Case C-224/01, Köbler v. Austria, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239.  
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of reference expressed the preliminary view that the length-of-service increment was neither a 
loyalty bonus nor a reward.
219  While that reference was pending, the ECJ upheld, in SchÅning-
Kougebetopoulou v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
220 a claim by a German municipal 
employee that denial of a similar salary increment violated EC law, but did not definitively rule 
on loyalty bonuses based exclusively on service with a single employer.  Thereafter, the 
Registrar of the ECJ asked if the Verwaltungsgerichtshof wished, in light of the SchÅning-
Kougebetopoulou decision, to maintain its request for a preliminary ruling.  The 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof sought the parties’ views, since “on a provisional view the legal issue 
which was the subject-matter of the question submitted for a preliminary ruling had been 
resolved in favour of Mr. Köbler.”
221  Some weeks later, however, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof 
withdrew its request for a preliminary ruling and proceeded to reject Köbler’s claim, viewing the 
increment as a loyalty bonus to reward longstanding service in Austrian universities rather than 
as a simple salary adjustment.
222
  Köbler then brought a second lawsuit, this one in the Austrian Civil Court, alleging that 
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, as an agency of the state, had violated his rights under EC law and 
seeking damages under Francovich.  The civil court referred to the ECJ, for a preliminary ruling, 
questions as to both the liability of the state for judicial action and the legality of denying Köbler 
 
 
219See Martin Breuer, State Liability for Judicial Wrongs and Community Law: The Case 
of Gerhard Köbler v. Austria, 29 EURO. L. REV. 243, 244 (2004). 
 
220Case C-15/96, [1998] ECR I-47. 
 
221Köbler, Paragraph 9. 
 
222Köbler, Paragraph 11.   
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the increment.  In this second round, the ECJ ruled that Köbler could maintain his damages 
action.  Relying on earlier statements that the principle of state liability applies whatever organ 
of a Member State has violated EC law
223 and on the proposition of international law that a state 
is liable for breach of an international agreement whether the violation resulted from legislative, 
executive, or judicial action, the Court found that the full effectiveness of EC law requires a 
damages remedy when a court of last instance has violated EC law.
224  So ruling, it reasoned, 
would not impair res judicata, because the second action did not necessarily have the same 
purpose and parties as the first, and a second judgment would not invalidate the prior judgment 
of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof but would merely award damages.
225  (One wonders what would 
remain, in substance, of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s judgment denying the length-of-service 
increment were the Austrian Civil Court to award damages--presumably in the amount Köbler 
would have received had he prevailed in the first action--for the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s 
rejection of his claim.
226)  On the merits, the ECJ held that denial of the increment violated EC 
 
 
223See, e.g., Joined Cases C-46/93 & 48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Germany and R. 
v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others, [1996] ERC I-1029, 
Paragraph 32; Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, [1999] ECR I-3099, Paragraph 62. 
 
224Köbler, Paragraphs 31-33. 
 
225Köbler, Paragraph 39. 
 
226For an American effort to justify collateral relitigation as not undermining the validity 
of an initial judgment, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).  There, the Court defended 
relitigation, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, of federal constitutional issues that had 
previously been resolved against the prisoner in state criminal prosecutions.  The Court argued 
that issuance of a writ of federal habeas corpus, ordering the state custodian to release the 
prisoner, “cannot revise the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the petitioner.”  
Id. at 430-31.  But as Justice Harlan convincingly responded, if a prisoner “is detained pursuant 
to a [state court] judgment, termination of the detention [because of a federal order directed at  
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law.  The Court also declared the Verwaltungsgerichtshof should have maintained its request for 
a preliminary reference.  (That point had been strongly urged by Advocate General Léger,
227 
who contended that the denial of Köbler’s claim implicated the EC’s principle of proportionality, 
to which the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had not even adverted, and that the conclusion that denial 
of the increment did not violate European law was hardly “so obvious as to leave no scope for 
any reasonable doubt.”
228)  
  The Court added, however, that in view of the nature of the judicial function and 
concerns expressed by Member States about the effect of liability on legal certainty, damages 
would be available only in the exceptional case in which a national court has manifestly 
infringed applicable European law
229--which depends upon such factors as the clarity and 
specificity of the rule that was violated, whether the violation was intentional, whether the 
erroneous legal conclusion was excusable, the views expressed by a Community institution, and, 
notably, the court’s failure to comply with its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling.
230  (This restrictive standard of liability for judicial acts may have been chosen because 
some Member States impose liability for acts of their highest judicial bodies only in exceptional 
 
the body] necessarily nullifies the judgment.”  Id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 
227See Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik 
Österreich, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, Paragraphs 170-72. 
 
228Id. Paragraph 173; see note 145, supra and accompanying text. 
 
229Köbler, Paragraph 53. 
 
230Compared to the general standard of Brasserie du Pêcheur of a sufficiently serious 
breach, this list of factors omits the measure of discretion possessed, while adding the failure to 
refer.  See Adrienne de Moor-van Vugt, Annotation on Gerhard Köbler and Republick 
Osterreich, 11 TILBURG FOREIGN L. REV. 782, 793 (2004).  
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circumstances  while others (Austria included) impose no liability at all.)
231   
  In the end, the ECJ held that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s breach was insufficiently 
manifest to justify liability.  That was in some respects a surprising result.  The Advocate 
General had criticized both the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s withdrawal of the referral and its 
failure to examine whether the increment satisfied the principle of proportionality.
232  But the 
withdrawal may have been viewed as less serious given the intervention of the ECJ’s own 
Registrar.
233  And while the Verwaltungsgerichtshof’s shift in characterization of the increment 
was embarrassing,
234 the initial characterization was provisional only, and some authority did 
suggest that a true loyalty bonus was lawful.
235
  It is also possible that the ECJ, in Köbler, may have sought to gain acceptance of a broad 
principle by limiting its consequences in the case at bar.
236  Trevor Hartley has viewed 
introduction of the Francovich doctrine as similar to other ECJ innovations that are introduced 
gradually in the first case, establishing a general principle that “is subject to various 
 
 
231See Breuer, supra note 219, at 249-50. 
 
232See Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik 
Österreich, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, Paragraphs 170-72. 
 
233See de Moor-van Vugt, supra note 230, at 793-94; Wattel, supra note 144, at 183; 
Claus Dieter Classen, Case Note on Köbler v. Republick Osterreich, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
813, 819 (2004). 
 
234Accord, de Moor-van Vugt, supra note 230, at 794. 
 
235See Breuer, supra note 219, at 250-51. 
 
236See p. ___, supra.  Accord, James E. Pfander, Köbler v. Austria: Expositional 
Supremacy and Member State Liability, forthcoming in BRIT. INST OF INT'L & COMP. L., MS at 
17-20.    
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qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the 
particular facts of the case. . . . If there are not too many protests, . . . in later cases [] the 
qualifications can then be whittled away . . . .”
237  American writers have viewed the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison
238 in a similar way,
239 and have also suggested that 
articulation of a new legal principle without attaching immediate remedial consequences to its 
violation permits courts to accelerate legal change by effectively giving major extensions of 
principles only prospective effect.
240  
  However the outcome in Köbler is explained, Europe and the United States feature 
sharply contrasting approaches to actions seeking damages on the basis that a state judiciary, in a 
prior proceeding, violated federal law.  As a first approximation, American law imposes no 
liability in such cases.  The state itself, and thus its judicial branch, is immune, and judges sued 
individually for actions taken in a judicial capacity, unlike most executive officials, possess an 
 
 
237T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 78-79 (1988).  See 
also, e.g., ALTER, supra note 4, at 19, 186-88 (noting that the monetary stakes in Van Gend en 
Loos, establishing direct effect, were small and that Costa, which declared that EC law was 
supreme, awarded no relief on the basis that national law was in compliance); Karen Alter, 
Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation 
of Theories of Legal Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS, supra note 
3, at 240 (explaining political acquiescence to European integration by its incremental nature, 
“making little steps in integration [that] seem tolerable, and refusing the little steps [that] seem 
disproportionately severe”). 
 
2385 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 
239See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960) (noting 
that the assertion of the power of judicial review, resulting in dismissal of the action for want of 
jurisdiction, in circumstances in which the Court’s power to enforce any judgment against the 
federal Executive was seriously in doubt, was a "masterpiece of indirection”). 
 
240See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 62, at 1734; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L. J. 87 (1999).  
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absolute immunity from liability.
241  Although many of the reasons underlying American 
immunity for judges would apply equally to Köbler,
242 one key reason given in American cases--
that the availability of appeal makes a damages remedy unnecessary
243--does not fully apply in 
Europe, as Köbler had no right to appeal from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof to the ECJ.   
  Beyond immunity, other procedural doctrines would pose additional barriers to an 
American version of Köbler’s second lawsuit.  In the United States, res judicata ordinarily bars 
parties from litigating, in a second proceeding, an issue of federal law that was either litigated 
(issue preclusion) or could have been litigated (claim preclusion) in the first proceeding.
244  
Indeed, were the two actions filed in the same court system, it could be more than a little 
awkward for a lower court in the latter proceeding to disregard a decision in the former by a 
court of last resort,
245 or even for a court of last resort to be asked in the second proceeding 
 
 
241See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
 
  Member States in Europe, by contrast, “tend to recognise personal liability of judicial 
officers, and as a result ‘vicarious’ liability of the State, for gross negligence, denial of justice, or 
criminal offence.” van Gerven, supra note 44, at 137. 
 
242These include:  " . . . the need for a judge to 'be free to act upon his own conviction, 
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'; . . . the controversiality and 
importance of the competing interests adjudicated by judges and the likelihood that the loser, 
feeling aggrieved, would wish to retaliate; . . . the record-keeping to which self-protective judges 
would be driven in the absence of immunity; . . . and . . .  the ease with which bad faith can be 
alleged and made the basis for 'vexatious litigation.'" PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: 
CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 90 (1983).  
 
243See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
 
244See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 
32-45 (claim preclusion), 46-60 (issue preclusion) (2001). 
 
245See de Moor-van Vugt, supra note 230, at 790.  
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whether its decision in the first litigation was a manifest infringement of federal law.
246
  That particular problem was not faced in Köbler, where the first proceeding was in the 
administrative courts and the second in the civil courts.  Still, those two courts belong to the 
same legal order.  And American preclusion doctrine operates even between separate judicial 
systems; thus, a state court litigation has claim and issue preclusive effect in a subsequent federal 
court proceeding--even as to an issue of federal law.
247  Indeed, in that precise situation, 
American law offers still another barrier to collateral relitigation--the much-criticized Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, which provides that the congressional grant of jurisdiction in the Supreme 
Court to review state court decisions on issues of federal law impliedly excludes federal trial 
courts from entertaining claims "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments rendered before the [federal trial] court proceedings commenced and 
inviting [federal trial] court review and rejection of those judgments."
248  American res judicata 
doctrine, like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, also draws a connection between collateral federal 
relitigation following a state court proceeding and the availability of Supreme Court review: in 
the rare cases in which, for somewhat technical reasons, a state court litigant could not have 
obtained Supreme Court review of a federal issue,
249 the Court has assumed that the state court 
 
 
246See Wattel, supra note 144, at 180. 
 
247See Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 765 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90 (1980). 
 
248Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005). 
 
249This can happen when a state court resolves a federal issue (a) when rendering a 
judgment that also rests on an “independent and adequate state ground”, so that Supreme Court 
review and reversal of the state court’s resolution of the federal law issue would not alter the  
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judgment rendered would lack preclusive effect in a subsequent federal court proceeding.
250
  It would be too much to suggest that judicial structures inhabit a Newtonian universe, in 
which one action (the unavailability vel non of federal appellate review of state court judgments) 
creates a corresponding reaction (the recognition vel non of damage actions against state courts 
for failure to respect federal norms).  Indeed, it is conventional wisdom that the ECJ’s success in 
its integrationist project depended upon enlisting national courts, and the cooperation could be 
threatened if national judges were to be rebuked for disregarding their duties under EC law.  
Still, one cannot help but wonder if the Köbler decision was motivated by concerns that many 
national courts of last resort were violating their broad obligation to refer issues of EC law
251 and 
were failing, when deciding cases following a referral to the ECJ, to carry out the fair 
implications of the ECJ’s decision.
252  On this view, Köbler can be seen as a warning shot to 
Member States that a failure to refer could result in liability--that, as Paul Craig had predicted, a 
national court’s refusal properly to apply EC law “will, literally, have a price, which is the 
 
state court’s judgment, or (b) when entertaining a dispute that is not a “case or controversy” 
under federal law.  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 37, at 138-40, 496-500. 
 
250See Fidelity Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927) (assuming that a 
state court decision of a federal issue in a proceeding that did not satisfy the federal courts’ “case 
or controversy” requirement would not be res judicata in a subsequent federal court action).  
 
251On the obligation, see note 145, supra and accompanying text.  On the failure to refer, 
see, e.g.,de la Mare, supra note 135, at 233; Constantin Stefanou & Helen Xanthaki, Are 
National Remedies the Only Way Forward?  Widening the Scope of Article 215(2) of the Treaty 
of Rome, in REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF EC LAW 85, 88-89 (Julian Lonbay & Andrea Biondi eds., 
1997). 
 
252Accord, Pfander, supra note 236,  (MS at 4).  See also Peter Van den Bossche, In 
Search of Remedies for Non-Compliance: The Experience of the European Community, 3 
MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 371, 375 (1996) (noting that “post litigation non-compliance 
. . . has become [a serious problem in the EC] since the mid-80s”).  
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possibility of a suit in damages brought by an individual against the state.”
253  (Interestingly, the 
ECJ drew on a principle of international law--that a nation is liable for treaty violations 
committed by any organ of government--in extending the right under Francovich, which is 
hardly a standard remedy for a Treaty violation.)   
 If  in  Köbler the ECJ was seeking, indirectly, to obtain a means, denied to it under the 
Treaties, of reviewing decisions of national courts that had made no referral, one can fairly 
question the legitimacy of this approach.
254  One wonders, also, whether liability for judicial acts 
might have been limited way to respond more directly to a failure of a national court of last 
resort to meet its obligation under Article 234 to refer an issue of EC law.  To be sure, because 
EC law provides individuals no right to have an issue of EC law referred, it may be that the 
damages claim would have to rest on a violation of substantive law rather than on the failure to 
refer.
255  But at a minimum, that failure could open up for relitigation a claim that otherwise 
would be concluded.
256
 If  the  Köbler decision was in fact motivated, at least in part, by concerns about whether 
the EC judicial structure offers adequate resources for enforcement of EC law against Member 
States, the decision offers uncertain promise of remedying any shortcomings.  Köbler surely 
provides an incentive for national courts to refer questions of EC law to the ECJ, at least where 
 
 
253Craig, supra note 20, at 72. 
 
254Accord, Pfander, supra note 236, MS at 13 & n. 61.   
 
255See Classen, supra note 233, at 820. 
 
256Insofar as liability is based upon the failure to refer, establishing causation could be 
difficult.  See Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik 
Osterreich, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, Paragraphs 149-51; Classen, supra note 233, at 821.  
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private rights are at issue.
257  Yet the ECJ is famously overburdened and backlogged, and “the 
queuing time in Luxembourg (more than two years) is already unacceptable.”
258  Moreover, if 
the underlying concern is the national courts’ lack of judicial cooperation (particularly a failure 
to refer) in the first proceeding, the damages remedy recognized by Köbler cannot be 
implemented without judicial cooperation (and possibly a referral from) the national courts in the 
second proceeding.  It remains to be seen whether permitting the relitigation that Köbler 
authorizes is more than a stop-gap measure that highlights the need for more fundamental 
revision of the EC judicial structure.
259
CONCLUSION 
  Comparative work has well-known limitations.  As Vicki Jackson has noted, comparisons 
are particularly complex when they address constitutional structures, which are difficult to 
disaggregate, as any particular feature (e.g., state liability or immunity doctrines) is only one 
component of a complex mixture of interactions.
260  Nonetheless, I hope that the comparative 
analysis I have offered will highlight strands of thought and structure that help to account for, 
and thus help us better to understand, the divergent paths taken in these two federal polities. 
The direction of the path taken by a particular polity is likely to depend upon a broad 
range of legal and political factors.  Thus, the availability of one mechanism of control may 
                                                 
 
257See Wattel, supra note 144, at 178; Pfander, supra note 236, MS at 5. 
 
258Wattel, supra note 144, at 179. 
 
259For discussion, see, e.g., Jacqué & Weiler, supra note 122. 
 
260Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L. J. 223, 273-74 (2001).  
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make recognition of another less important; a general acceptance in Member State legal systems 
of a particular remedy, like governmental liability, may make its recognition by federal law more 
acceptable; robust remedies may be more acceptable when the Member States have greater 
control over the substance of the underlying federal obligations.  In addition, basic approaches to 
constitutional interpretative methodology (the primacy of a non-textual, non-originalist, 
teleological approach of the EC versus the eclectic American approach, with important strains of 
originalism) may influence the choice of remedial techniques.  And the willingness of judges to 
impose robust remedies may depend on a complex political calculus: their capacity to obtain a 
reasonable degree of compliance; the drift of sentiment in the polity about the exercise of federal 
power; and the extent to which judicial appointments respond to the course of that sentiment.  
These kinds of factors may, however, not determine but merely bound and influence the judicial 
direction--a point particularly vivid in the United States, where the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity, though longstanding, has in recent years been maintained by the margin of only one 
vote in the Supreme Court. 
  But there are commonalities as well as divergences to be highlighted.  By their nature, 
federal systems face problems in ensuring Member State compliance with federal law and must 
develop tools to promote compliance that are both reasonably effective against and reasonably 
acceptable to Member States.
261  In both polities, the courts have rejected the position that only 
the legislature may establish such remedies, and instead have taken it upon themselves to a 
considerable extent to find a path that strikes the right balance of competing objectives.  In both, 
the path has been illuminated by doctrines governing the liability of the federal government 
 
 
261Accord, Snyder, supra note 122, at 22; Pfander, supra note 236, forthcoming.  
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itself.    
  There are commonalities between Europe and the United States in one other important 
respect.  Both systems have cushioned the impact of damages liability for governmental action 
(whether imposed directly on governments themselves, as in the EC, or on government officials, 
as the United States) by making liability depend not merely on the fact that federal law was 
violated, but, ordinarily, on a demonstration that the violation was a significant one.
262  That 
cushion is provided in the United States by the limitation of liability to violations of clearly 
established law, and in the EC by the requirement that the breach be sufficiently serious--which 
turns in substantial part on the scope of discretion left by EC law to the member state, and thus 
often on whether “settled case-law” makes the violation clear
263 or whether the error of law was 
excusable.
264  The cushions in the two systems thus bear considerably similarity, and they go a 
long way toward giving Member States one bite at the apple: unless they are in rather obvious 
violation of federal law, only prospective compliance, not compensation for past harm caused, 
will be required. 
  Thus, if constitutional remedies can be seen as serving two basic goals--providing 
compensation to those whose rights have been infringed, and creating a system of sanctions 
 
 
262I say ordinarily because (i) municipalities enjoy neither absolute nor official immunity 
when sued for damages, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), (ii) the official 
immunities enjoyed by state officials in actions under § 1983 may or may not apply in actions 
under other federal statutes, see, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1357 n. 96, and (iii) Congress, 
when it has exercised its power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, can render states liable in 
damages with no such cushion. 
 
263DOUGAN, supra note 24, at 244-45. 
 
264See Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik 
Osterreich, [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, Paragraph 139.  
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designed to ensure an adequate level of adherence to constitutional rights--both the EC and the 
U.S., to a considerable extent, have focused more on the latter than the former.
265  Limiting the 
immediate remedial consequences of violations permits, from the standpoint of the federal polity, 
a more rapid evolution of substantive law,
266 because, from the standpoint of the Member States, 
such evolution will be less objectionable if the costs of compliance are not immediate.  Both 
systems, then, can be seen as sacrificing the protection of individual rights in the short-term to 




265Accord, Pfander, supra note 236, MS at 5. 
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